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Abstract
In this paper, I analyze recent economic and political trends by providing
an in depth look at the National Heritage Area (NHA) program. By tracing their
conception and origination back to the early 1980s, I attempt to place NHAs
within the larger framework of deindustrialization and government cutbacks that
were occurring at the time. Furthermore, I show how, with their emphasis on
building social capital and creating cross-jurisdictional ties, NHAs were a natural
response to emerging “new regionalist” ideals in America. By embracing the
concept of regional partnerships to enhance economic competitiveness, NHAs
signaled a new drive towards geographical thinking throughout much of the
country.
After providing a quick survey of the existing academic literature, I take a
closer look at the NHA program by making use of three case studies. In telling the
stories of these three areas, I attempt to show why there has been such an
increasing demand for NHA designation in recent years.
Finally, I show that, because of a lack of enforced standards, the NHA
program has become susceptible to partisan forces, both locally and on Capitol
Hill. Furthermore, I use testimony from National Park Service officials to show
that the program is now in real danger of running out of funds. With such a
flawed system of designation, I end by posing some critical questions for a
program in need of a direction.
Ultimately, I conclude that, while these issues are troubling, the true
significance of the NHA program comes from its reliance upon the idea of
geographical place. By embracing the power of geography to drive economic
competitiveness, NHAs are just one example of how spatial concerns have
become increasingly important in today’s society.
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Introduction: National Heritage Areas
More than Meets the Eye
“If you would converse with me, you must first define your terms." - Voltaire

What, exactly, is a National Heritage Area? Many Americans would be
surprised to learn that there is a fairly good chance, about one in three, that they
live in one.1 In fact, in the Northeastern United States, it is difficult to find a place
more than a couple hours’ drive away from one of these regions (Appendix,
Figure 1). With 49 designations in 32 states, National Heritage Areas (NHAs)
cover more ground and contain more people than any other land use program in
the history of the United States.2
Designated by Congress and affiliated with the National Park Service
(NPS), heritage areas are nominally recognized as federal entities. However,
unlike their more glamorous older sibling, the National Park, heritage areas are
not managed directly by the federal government. The NPS provides funding and
technical assistance, but it does not own any land and is prohibited from
exercising control over property rights, environmental standards, or land use

1 Heather Scotten, Assistant Coordinator of National Heritage Area Program, National Park
Service. Telephone interview, 26 October 2010.

2 Ibid.

2

regulations of any kind3. In this relationship, it is the private sector that holds the
reins of power, with the park service relegated to the role of watchful guardian.
Although there is no set formula for designation, heritage areas usually
arise through the cooperative efforts of local stakeholders, from chambers of
commerce to preservationist groups, public officials, and even ordinary citizens.
These stakeholders then begin the long process of lobbying Congress for a
recognition of “national significance” on behalf of their region. If they are
successful, the stakeholders are officially recognized as a governing body for the
new heritage area, and Congress grants them three years to formulate a
management plan and have it approved by the Secretary of the Interior.4 At this
point, the area becomes eligible to receive federal dollars and technical advice,
which is then supplemented with state, local, and private funds in order to further
the stated goals of the management plan.
When it comes to defining an overall theme or purpose for the NHA
movement, the existing literature is disappointingly vague. Due to the nature of
the program, no two regions have the same stated goals, and because each area is
designated on a case-by-case basis, management plans tend to differ widely in
their function. Indeed, with the scale of heritage areas ranging from just a few

3 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, Hearings on HR 1280: To
establish guidelines for the purpose of National Heritage Area Programs and other purposes. 28
th
st
March 1995. 104 Cong., 1 Sess. Web. 28 December 2010. 21.

4 Katie Durcan, Assistant Coordinator of National Heritage Area Program, National Park Service.
Telephone interview, 3 November 2010.
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counties to the entire state of Tennessee,5 articulating a common purpose would
seem a hopeless task. However, upon closer inspection, some broad, unifying
themes begin to emerge.
According to the National Park Service, heritage areas are similar in that
they offer “Nationally distinctive cultural, historic, scenic, and natural resources
that, when linked together, tell a unique story about our country.”6 This idea of a
“nationally significant” narrative is prominent in most descriptions of the
program, with the idea being that designation will serve to promote, and
ultimately protect, that region’s history. In the words of one non-profit group, the
definitive goal of the heritage area movement is simply “to recognize, preserve
and celebrate America's defining landscapes.”7
Thus, at first glance, National Heritage Areas are, to put it bluntly, exactly
what they sound like: areas of exceptionally rich heritage, recognized at the
national level and assisted by the federal government. It is a simple concept: easy
to understand, easy to explain, and largely unobjectionable to the general public.
If the story were to end right here, it would make for a vaguely interesting
but wholly unremarkable tale, best suited for the back pages of travel brochures or

5 “Interactive Map of National Heritage Areas,” National Park Service. 9 October 2009. Web. 28
December 2010.

6 “National Heritage Area FAQs,” National Park Service. 11 August 2010. Web. 3 January 2011.
7 “What is a National Heritage Area?” The Alliance of National Heritage Areas. 13 December
2010. Web. 3 January 2011.

4

government websites. However, the next few chapters of the heritage area story
prove to be much more nuanced, controversial and, ultimately, more exciting.
A Weapon in the War for Economic Stability
While historic preservation is certainly an important part of the equation, it
is not, and never has been, the true catalyst for the heritage areas movement.
Beneath their sunny, feel-good exterior, heritage areas are often viewed as useful
tools in the struggle to attain economic stability. In many cases, they allow
otherwise fragmented regions to coalesce around a shared identity, strengthening
community ties and improving local morale. In other cases, they provide regions
with the opportunity to showcase an attractive image, making themselves more
amenable to prospective tourists and businesses. Essentially, for many
communities across the country, NHAs represent far more than mere badges of
pride and recognition. Rather, they represent a tangible opportunity for
municipalities to work together towards the common goal of economic prosperity.
Of course, no historical movement can be analyzed in a vacuum, and so it
becomes necessary to contextualize the development of heritage areas within the
larger scheme of economic and social history.
Indeed, looking back to the origination of NHAs in the early 1980s,
evidence seems to suggest that heritage areas were a natural outgrowth of
changing economic and fiscal conditions in the United States. During this period,
there was a concerted effort to deemphasize the role of the central government in
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many domestic affairs, especially those involving aid to inner cities. At the same
time, there was a continuing trend towards deindustrialization across much of the
country, a trend exacerbated by Reagan-era cutbacks in federal assistance. Thus,
as is often the case in periods of great crisis, many localities felt compelled to
search for new methods of economic sustainability to compete in an era of scarce
resources.
In this climate of fiscal austerity, cities often were left to fend for
themselves, a situation that frequently placed them into direct geographic
competition with each other. For these cities hoping to compete with distant
rivals, it often made sense to partner with immediate neighbors in order to
increase their economic clout. By forming rich, mutually-reinforcing webs of
social connectedness, many regions found they could attain a level of innovation
and productivity greater than the sum of their parts. In time, this capacity to form
inter-jurisdictional partnerships, known as “regional clusters,” would come to be
seen as a key advantage in an economy dominated by the free flow of money and
ideas.
As I will attempt to make clear in this paper, I believe that the heritage
area movement was, at least in part, a reaction to this new trend towards regional
development. By forging a common consensus around the theme of geographical
identity, heritage areas felt they could generate the enthusiasm and grassroots
activism needed to transform individual towns and cities into larger, more
cohesive units. In this sense, support from the federal government was modest but
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essential; by legitimizing an area’s claims of “national significance,” designation
effectively served as the nucleus around which a regional framework could be
built. Once this legitimacy was “seeded” from above, heritage areas then could
begin to create a reputation for themselves, attracting tourists and new businesses
in an effort to attain economic stability.
Too Much of A Good Thing?
By the mid-1990s, heritage areas had gained the reputation as potential
moneymakers, and as such, they became a hot commodity on the political market
(Appendix, Figure 2). Even today, the popularity of the program is continuing to
increase. As of April 2011, there are ten proposals waiting to be reviewed by
Congress along with dozens more in the early planning stages8. Although
quantitative evidence is lacking, there is at least the belief among the program’s
followers that heritage areas are major difference-makers in the race to attain
comparative geographical advantages. In a purely perceptual sense, then, the
program must be viewed as an unqualified success. However, despite the
movement’s popularity and largely unobjectionable reputation, there remain some
inherent flaws in the overall structure of the program.
For one, there is a major disconnect between how heritage areas present
themselves to the public and how they are perceived in more elite circles. While
the program’s preservationist and historical credentials are frequently celebrated,

8 Katie Durcan, Op. cit.
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the public rarely hears about its more tangible function as an agent of regional
competitiveness. More troubling, however, is the lack of defined criteria for what
these regions actually are. There is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes
“national significance,” nor is there any objective measure to determine which
regions deserve designation and which do not. More often, designation is simply
determined by which regions have the political connections needed to gain access
to Capitol Hill. In fact, once a heritage area bill reaches Congress, it is virtually
guaranteed to pass, regardless of its legislative merits.
Lastly, as more areas continue to be designated, it is unlikely that the Park
Service will be able to find the resources needed to support them all. With such a
lax designation process and no enforceable mechanisms for terminating funding,
the heritage area program seems destined to outgrow the relatively limited amount
of funds set aside for its continuation.
Thus, while heritage areas might seem like a good idea in theory; in
practice, the program is rife with misconceptions and inconsistencies. By
presenting a public image so out of step with its actual goals, it obscures what is,
in effect, a geographical struggle for scarce economic resources. In this struggle,
some regions are fortunate enough to receive a boost from the federal government
while others are not. Furthermore, given the way the program currently is
structured, regions obtain federal assistance, not because they have intrinsically
better claims to historical or cultural significance, but rather because their
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organizational prowess allows them to compete more effectively in the political
arena.
To some, this arrangement may seem unfair. To others, it may seem a
natural and justifiable reaction to economic trends that are beyond these regions’
immediate control. Either way, one fact remains unmistakably clear: the heritage
area program, despite its humble reputation, offers a much more compelling story
than originally meets the eye.

9

Chapter 1: Competition through Cooperation
The Economic Factors Behind NHA Development
“A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the
opportunity in every difficulty.” - Winston Churchill
In Flint, Michigan, the housing market is so depressed that many homes sell
for just a dollar apiece.9 In Youngstown, Ohio, public officials have taken to
bulldozing entire neighborhoods in the hopes of reducing city maintenance
costs.10 In Cleveland, population loss is occurring so rapidly that, if one week’s
worth of emigrants were to leave simultaneously, they would be able to fill the
seats of two full-size Greyhound buses.11 In Detroit, if one were to lay out all of
the city’s vacant lots side by side, the resulting space would be large enough to
cover the entire city of San Francisco.12
As incredible as these facts may seem, they nevertheless fail to convey the
full degree of hardship and pain felt by so many of America’s industrial cities
since the 1960s. It was a hardship caused, not by any particular fault of the cities
themselves, but rather by a series of economic and fiscal changes arising at the

9 Tracy Samilton, “Flint, Michigan Sheds Foreclosed Properties,” NPR News. 20 October 2007.
Web 5 January 2011.

10 Les Christie, “The Incredible Shrinking City,” CNN Money. 24 April 2008. Web. 4 January 2011
11 Timothy Homan, “Cleveland Third Nationwide in Population Loss,” The Columbus Dispatch. 24
.March 2010. Web. 5 January 2011.

12 Michael McKee and Alex Ortolani, “GM’s Bust Turns Detroit into Urban Lot Prairie of Vacant
Lot Farms,” Bloomberg News. 8 December 2008. Web. 4 January 2011.
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national and international levels. In a very real sense then, these urban localities
were victims of economic forces entirely beyond their control. However, while
these problems originated from outside sources, their solutions would have to
come from within.
In an age of increasingly scarce resources, the keys to economic success
often lay in a community’s ability to create geographical linkages and innovative
partnerships across jurisdictional lines. Ultimately, in this new cutthroat economy,
cities would have to cooperate in order to compete.
An Unstoppable Force: American Manufacturing After WWII
Many historians refer to the 1900s as “The American Century,” and after
looking at the economic data, it is not difficult to see why.13 In 1945, as much of
Europe and Asia lay in ruins, the United States emerged from the rubble of WWII
as an economic superpower, ready to unleash its concentrated industrial might
upon the world. In those brief, fast-paced years, half of the world’s manufactured
products were made in America. Consumer confidence and union membership
were high while unemployment and inflation were low.14 By the mid-1950s,
despite the notable exclusion of women and minorities, the American Dream
finally seemed attainable to the expanding middle class. In many ways, the 20

13 Walter LaFeber, et. al., The American Century: A History of the United States Since the 1890s
(New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2008) Preface: xiii.

14 Ibid. 347.
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years after WWII, while not without some dips and panics, remain unmatched in
their creation of prosperity for the average American worker.
By the late 1960s, however, the first stirrings of long-term fiscal troubles
were becoming apparent. Inflation inched above 5% in 1969, only to explode four
years later as a series of supply shocks led to dramatic shortages in the world’s
energy market.15 As the decade wore on, economists began to refer ominously to
the new trend of “stagflation,” a seemingly counterintuitive combination of
inflation and slowed growth.16
During these difficult times, no sector of the American economy was hit
harder than heavy industry. In the 40 years between 1969 and 2009, the
percentage of the American workforce engaged in manufacturing fell from 26
percent to less than 10 percent.17 Throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s, this decline
was reflected mostly by a shrinking ratio of manufacturing jobs to service sector
jobs, rather than an actual loss in industrial employment. However, following the
2000 - 2002 recession, nearly five million manufacturing jobs were lost outright,
dropping payrolls to their lowest level since the Great Depression.18

15 John Early, et. al., “A Half-year Pause in Inflation: Its Antecedents and Structure,” Monthly
Labor Review 109 (1986): 4.

16 Alan Blinder, Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation (New York: Academic Press, 1981) 11.
17 “Manufacturing Employment by Year,” Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 January 2011. Web.
.7 January 2011.

18 Ibid.
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In the existing literature, there are many competing explanations for this
apparent decline in American industrial prowess. However, while these
conflicting narratives merit further study, the exact reasons for deindustrialization
are not necessary for the scope of this paper. Instead, it is sufficient to
acknowledge that, by the 1970s, much of America was suffering from a
slowdown in economic activity, the worst of which was occurring within the
sector of heavy manufacturing.
Urban Areas in Decline: America’s Rust Belt
For the country as a whole, America’s loss of industrial jobs can best be
described as a chronic malady; although serious, it did not present an immediate
danger to the survival of the national economy. For a few major cities in the MidAtlantic and Inland North, however, the decline in manufacturing was a more
acute problem, and its effects on the ground were nothing short of disastrous.19
After centuries of rapid growth, the population of most major Northeastern cities
began to decline after 1960, and in some cases, such as Detroit and Cleveland,
they fell by more than 50%.20 As workers from these cities dispersed throughout
the country, many chose to head south and west to the so-called Sun Belt, where
the weather was nicer and the jobs more plentiful. Others, however, relocated to
just a few miles beyond city limits, creating a massive, sprawling exurbia around

19 Marlene Lee and Mark Mather, “US Labor Force Trends,” Population Bulletin 63 (2008) 7.
20 Brian Louis, “Rustbelt Cities Demolish Homes as Defaults Blight Neighborhoods,” Bloomberg
News. 18 November 2010. Web. 19 December 2010 .

13

a hollow urban core. Left behind in this exodus from inner cities were the old, the
poor, and the racially marginalized, forming a permanent underclass amongst the
abandoned factories and vacant lots.21
By the 1970s, deindustrialization was largely seen as an urban problem.
More specifically, it was seen as a problem highly concentrated among the
manufacturing cities of the Upper Midwest.22 As bad as things were, however,
they would only continue to get worse. During the late 70s and early 80s, a
revolution in political thinking would begin to challenge the legitimacy of the
nation’s vast network of urban assistance programs; programs which had been
growing, largely uninterrupted, for nearly half a century.
1933-1978: The Golden Age of Keynesian Economics
In the midst of the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt assumed the
presidency promising a “New Deal” for the American worker. In order to achieve
this goal, Roosevelt would authorize a dramatic expansion in the role of the
central government, approving massive federal outlays to states and localities in
hopes of stimulating employment on the ground and demand in the markets. This
plan, influenced by the work of British economist John Maynard Keynes, aimed

21 Thomas Sugrue. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) Preface: xxi.

22 Marlene Lee and Mark Mather, Op. Cit., 8.
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to spread the benefits of full employment and high wages as evenly as possible,
targeting struggling areas with offers of federal assistance.23
In the 1960s under President Johnson, the United States redoubled its
efforts to “level the playing field.”24 Social assistance programs and generous
government grants to struggling municipalities became commonplace, and in
1965, after the passage of Medicare, even the conservative economist Milton
Friedman was forced to sourly admit that “We are all Keynesians now.”25 Indeed,
by the mid 1970s, more than a quarter of all of the money spent by states and
cities came directly from the federal treasury. 26
Thus, even as deindustrialization took hold during the early 1970s, many
urban areas managed to avoid its worst effects by relying upon the federal
government for monetary assistance. By the end of the decade, however, a new
shift in the political climate would force these cities to begin fending for
themselves in an increasingly competitive fiscal environment.

23 Bob Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State,” in A. Amin (Ed.) Post-Fordism: A Reader
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994) 254.

24 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe Inc.,1990) 5.

25 “The Economy: We Are all Keynesians Now,” Time Magazine. 31 December 1965. Web. 11
January 2011.
26 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, Op. Cit. 8
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A Shock to the System: The Tax Revolt of 1978
The first true blow to the New Deal/Keynesian consensus took place on
June 6, 1978, when California voters overwhelmingly approved the Jarvis-Gunn
Amendment, better known as Proposition 13. In less than 400 words, the new law
completely gutted California’s most important source of revenue, lowering
property tax returns by almost 60%. Over the next two-and-a-half years, no less
than 22 states followed California’s example, leading to what many observers
called “a full-scale tax revolt.”27
In November of 1978, a poor Democratic showing in the midterm
elections suggested that this newfound voter hostility was more than just a passing
phase.28 Indeed, after 45 years of liberal dominance, a deep conservative backlash
was beginning to take hold across the country. According to economist David
Stoesz, there was a growing concern that New Deal economics had “violated
citizens’ privacy and harmed growth by ‘confiscating’ private resources in the
form of taxation for welfare expenditure.”29 In the opinion of fiscal conservatives,
government, in the quest to ensure equality, had spent itself into oblivion, wasting

27 Ibid., 9.
28 Jim Luther, “Election Results,” AP Newswire: AM Cycle. 8 November 1978. Web. 13 January
2011.
29 David Stoesz, “The Radical Right and the Welfare State,” in H. Glennester and J. Midgley (Eds.)
The Radical Right and the Welfare State: An International Perspective (Oxford, Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1991) 31.

16

hard-earned tax dollars on programs that did little more than “reward failure” and
foster “a culture of dependence.”30
As frustration grew, President Carter stunned many of his closest
supporters by announcing a new “lean and austere” budget, which reduced or
eliminated many public works projects and local development initiatives.31 While
certainly a bold move, Carter’s actions turned out to be too little, too late. The
following year, Ronald Reagan captured the presidency in an electoral landslide,
due in large part to his promises to take on what many saw as a bloated and
inefficient government structure.
Ronald Reagan and the New Federalism
While Carter aimed to streamline the existing federal system through
incremental changes, Reagan sought nothing less than a complete redefinition of
government’s role in society.32 The central government, he argued, had little
business sticking its nose in issues like welfare assistance and subsidized housing,
issues that could be dealt with most efficiently at the local level. If a locality
wanted to spend its money on such programs, then so be it, but it should not

30 Ibid., 32.
31 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, Op. Cit., 10.
32 For a more complete discussion, see: Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan,
Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
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expect any help from above. "The national government,” Reagan said, “should be
worrying about arms control, not potholes."33
In his first State of the Union Address in 1982, Reagan expounded upon
this idea by introducing what soon would be known as “The New Federalism.”
Essentially, the federal government would assume responsibility for Medicaid,
but only if states promised to assume the full burden of welfare and food stamp
provisions. Additionally, other federal assistance programs would be phased out
over a period of five years, after which states and localities would be expected to
pay for them on their own.34
Although results on the ground were not as sweeping as Reagan had
originally hoped for, many of his proposed domestic cutbacks did succeed in
become law. Between 1980 and 1987, for instance, aid to urban areas fell by
47%.35 This decline was especially notable given the fact that, during this time,
the budgets of most other federal programs actually increased. Additionally, lowincome entitlement spending was cut by half during the 1980s, leading to the
strange phenomenon of increasing poverty in the midst of economic recovery.
Indeed, by 1986, the metropolitan poverty rate had expanded to more than 20%;
33 Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” Center for Public Policy Research. 26 January
1982. Web. 28 December 2010 .

34 Ibid.
35 Dale Crane, “Devolution, fiscal federalism, and changing patterns of municipal revenues: the
mismatch between theory and reality,” Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory 14
(2004) 524.

18

higher even than during the recession years of mid 1970s.36 By 1984, liberal
activists had begun to warn of a permanent underclass being created among
America’s urban industrial centers. Alluding to the famous agricultural blight of
the 1930s, they called this disturbing new trend “The Rust Bowl.”37
Survival of the Fittest: New Federalism and Geographical Competition
Today, views of Reagan’s domestic policies differ widely across the
political spectrum. However, amongst most observers, there is broad agreement
that new federalism represented a major change in the way the central government
interacted with localities.38 While previously, government grants were distributed
largely on a basis of need, they now tended to favor competition and efficiency.
With an overall reduction in domestic aid, there was a corresponding rise in the
distribution of block grants; packets of money intended for the sole benefit of a
single geographic area. As a rule, these grants were typically awarded to
whichever region promised to leverage federal funds in the cheapest, most costeffective manner.39

36 Bureau of the Census, Poverty in the United States: 1986 (Washington DC: US Department of
Commerce, 1986) 20.

37 Sean Safford, Why the Garden Club Couldn’t Save Youngstown: The Transformation of the
Rust Belt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009) 3.
38 For a positive take on these changing relations, see Gordon Tullock, et. al., Government
Failure: A Primer in Public Choice (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2002). For a more critical view,
see David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
39 Gilbert Metcalf, Professor of Economics at Tufts University, Personal Interview, 1 January
2011.
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Although this method of distribution was seen by some as the result of
poor planning, it was actually an essential component of New Federalist ideology.
If localities were forced to fight for their money in an open market, the theory
went, then each would have no choice but to operate in a frugal and efficient
manner.40 As one current governor recently suggested, "Competition works. Let
them come up with their best plans, compete against the other regions and we will
fund the most creative plans."41 Essentially, by introducing the powerful incentive
of financial ruin, the government could make sure that only the best and most
cost-effective strategies rose to the top. Once these strategies became known,
other localities would be forced to imitate them in order to receive money. In this
way, the most optimal distribution of resources could be achieved through the
powers of supply and demand, leaving the central government free to pursue
other, more appropriate matters.
Thus, it is generally acknowledged that, by the 1980s, there was an
increasing emphasis on interregional competition across much of the United
States.42 As localities faced the twin pressures of globalization and
deindustrialization, they could no longer count on help from above, and would

40 John Shannon and James Kee, “The Rise of Competitive Federalism,” Public Budgeting and
Finance 9 (1989) 7.
41 “Governor Andrew M. Cuomo State of the State Address,” New York State. 5 January 2011.
Web. 13 March 2011.
42 This emerging consensus is examined by Ian Gordon and Nick Buck, “Cities in the New
Conventional Wisdom,” in A. Harding et. al., (Eds.) Changing Cities: Rethinking Urban
Competitiveness, Cohesion and Governance (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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instead have to compete against each other for resources in the open market. In
this sense, the concept of geographical place became an increasingly important
notion within many economic circles.43 According to these thinkers, the
distribution of resources was becoming increasingly defined along spatial lines;
one region’s gain was another region’s loss. In this zero-sum game, the regions
that could out-produce and out-innovate their competition would end up
becoming successful on the global stage.44
Regional Clusters: A New Model for a New Economy
As communities struggled to adapt themselves to these changing
conditions, many drew inspiration from a developing school of economic thought,
known in academic circles as “New Regionalism.”45 Essentially, the theory
claimed that, with rising competition at the local level and decreasing assistance
from above, the region would soon replace the locality as the most effective and
innovative geographical unit . In the words of Michael Porter, an early proponent
of this theory, “The enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie
increasingly in regional things—knowledge, relationships, motivation—that
43 For an early take on these ideas, see Paul Krugman, “Increasing Returns and Economic
Geography,” Journal of Political Economy. 99 (1991) 483-99. Also, see S. Scotchmer, “Space and
Competition: A Puzzle,” Annals of Regional Science 26 (1992) 269-286, and Michael Porter,
“Competitive Advantage, Agglomeration Economies, and Regional Policy,” International Regional
Science Review 19 (1996) 85-94
44 Jonathan Bradbury, Devolution, Regionalism, and Regional Development (Oxford: Routledge,
2008) 18.
45 For a more comprehensive discussion on this topic, see Kevin Ward and Andrew Jonas,
“Competitive city-regionalism as a politics of space: a critical reinterpretation of the new
regionalism.” Environment and Planning 36 (2004) 2119-2139.
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distant rivals cannot match.”46 In other words, by pooling their collective
resources, cities could be “scaled up” into regional entities. Then, once these
regional partnerships were established, participating cities could expect distinct
competitive advantages against localities that had failed to form such networks.
For these new regionalist thinkers, then, the secret to attaining economic stability
was almost zen-like in its message: in order to compete, regions first would have
to learn to cooperate.
Certainly, for cities interested in new regionalist theory, the goal of
increased cooperation was easier said than done. Before cities could begin acting
as a regional unit, they first would have to build the necessary bonds of solidarity
and trust. In the business world, this repository of good will and shared
responsibility was known as “social capital,” and after 1980, it became an
increasingly important concept in regional development.47 For prospective
regions, the options for generating social capital were numerous and, among these
options, there were no sure-fire methods for success.
Increasingly, as the decade wore on, more and more places would begin to
turn to the concept of heritage as a rallying point for regional cooperation. By
building a sense of shared identity around a common history, communities could

46 “Clusters and the New Economics of Competition,” Harvard Business Review 76 (1998) 78.
47 A more detailed look at region-specific social capital is provided in Sriya Iyer, et. al., “Social
Capital, Economic Growth, and Regional Development,” Regional Studies 39 (2005) 1015-1040.
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begin to develop a sense of regional pride that would allow them to operate as a
larger whole.
Heritage Areas: A Golden Opportunity
With their emergence during the early 1980s, heritage areas were very
much a reflection of changing economic and fiscal realities. By emphasizing
regional cooperation, they hoped to allow former industrial cities to compete in an
increasingly competitive global climate. Also, by focusing upon the role of
history and sense of place, heritage areas attempted to enhance social capital and
create a sense of regional solidarity.48 As Mike DeWine, a Senator from Ohio, put
it, “Together, we can accomplish more than working separately. Together, we are
linked by geographical proximity and a shared heritage, and if we can only realize
this, there is literally nothing we cannot do.”49
Of course, the heritage area movement is a large and diverse program,
and, in analyzing its development, it is necessary to avoid over-generalizations
and claims that cannot be supported by direct evidence. Therefore, in the
following chapter, I present a case study of the Illinois and Michigan Canal
Corridor, the nation’s first heritage area. In it, I show how a group of struggling
manufacturing towns managed to transform themselves into a fully-functional,
48 For a quantitative take on social capital in heritage areas, see Daniel N. Laven, et. al., “From
Partnerships to Networks: New Approaches for Measuring US National Heritage Area
Effectiveness,” Evaluation Review 34 (2010) 271-298.
49 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing on S.311: To Conduct Oversight
on the Designation and Management of Heritage Areas. 13 March 2003, 108th Cong., 1st
Sess. Web. 28 December 2010. 16.
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thriving regional network. By bringing together the diverse interests of
environmentalists, businessmen, and politicians, the I&M Canal was able to build
a regional consensus that would have been impossible just decades before. In
doing so, it would sow the seeds for a much larger movement in the years to
come.
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Chapter 2: A Bold, Precedent-Setting Concept
The Story of the Nation’s First Heritage Area
“It is time to give us our money back!”
– James Thompson, Governor of Illinois

Shortly after 2pm on August 17, 1982, three men in business suits filed
into the central offices of the US Department of the Interior. The men, all
Congressmen from Illinois, were on a mission to seek administrative approval for
what they called a “national heritage corridor,” a sort of “industrialized national
park” that would run along the eastern confines of Chicago’s outer suburbs.50 The
plan was a remarkably clever one, but even so, its approval seemed very much in
doubt. Over the past 18 months, the Office of the Interior had become a place
where preservationist ideas went to die, and for this, no one was more responsible
than the Interior Secretary himself.
“James G. Watt,” wrote Salon Magazine “was the man that 80s-era
environmentalists loved to hate.”51 Never one to mince words, he had taken office
with the simple pledge to “Mine more, drill more, and cut more timber.” There
was no reason, he argued, why national park lands shouldn’t be opened up for
logging and drilling. After all, in Watt’s opinion, the Bible had given man the
right to use Earth as he saw fit. For preservationists, Watt felt only scorn. "If the

50 Gerald Adelmann, Personal interview, 19 Jan. 2011.
51 Andrew Leonard, “No, WaPo, Reagan as not Pro-solar and Pro-Wind,” Salon. 26 August 2010.
Web. 13 January 2011.
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troubles from environmentalists cannot be solved in the jury box or at the ballot
box,” he once angrily declared, “perhaps the cartridge box should be used."52
For these reasons, few thought Watt would support any plan whose stated
purpose was to preserve and protect a geographic landscape, especially one which
required federal dollars. Therefore, when the three Illinois Congressmen emerged
from Watt’s office with his full, enthusiastic approval, the general atmosphere
was split somewhere between elation and bewilderment.53 After three years of
hectic planning and consensus-building, Illinois was finally on its way towards
receiving the economic help it so desperately needed. Even better, it had
succeeded by beating the Reagan administration at its own game.
An Idea is Born
When Gerald Adelmann, age 29, arrived in Lockport, Illinois, after a
break from his doctoral studies in Washington DC, he returned home to a
community in decline. The year was 1979, and a worldwide energy crisis had
already begun to cripple the local Texaco oil refinery, Lockport’s largest
employer.54 Unable to turn a profit, the plant would close its doors forever just
two years later. In nearby Joliet, the situation was even worse. US Steel and
Caterpillar Manufacturing were on the verge of financial collapse, and
52 Kirkpatrick Sale and Eric Foner, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental
Movement, 1962-1992 (Washington DC: Library of Congress, 1993) 102.

53 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
54 Laurent Belsie, “Canal comes back to life as recreational and historic landmark,” Christian
Science Monitor. 16 November 1994. Web. 22 December 2010.
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unemployment had already shot up past 10%, soon to reach 25%.55 Mr.
Adelmann, however, had not come to Illinois to address these current economic
woes. Instead, he had come to study a distant and much more profitable past.
The Illinois and Michigan Canal was generally regarded as one of the
most important public works projects of the 1800s.56 Completed in 1848, the 96mile canal linked the waters of the Mississippi to the shores of Lake Michigan,
providing the final inland connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of
Mexico (Appendix, Figure 3). In just a few decades, the canal would help
transform Chicago from a muddy frontier town of 20,000 people to a bustling,
world-class city of almost half a million. At its peak, the canal would haul over a
million tons of freight per year and would require the full-time service of 132
barges.57 After 1900, however, the canal fell into steep disrepair, and by the 1970s
it had become an industrial waste heap of abandoned locks and crumbling
foundations.58

55 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
56 For an early-20th century account of the importance of the canal, see James Putnam in The
Illinois and Michigan Canal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918).

57 David Fogarty, “Illinois’ ‘Hidden History’ Found on Canal Corridor,” Chicago Tribune. 2 August
1985. Web. 12 January 2011.
58 Jim Redd, The Illinois and Michigan Canal: A Contemporary Perspective In Essays and
Photographs (United States: New Leaf Studios, 1993) 3.
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At some point, walking among these aging relics, Mr. Adelmann was
struck with a profound idea.59 This old canal had once breathed life into the
economy of northern Illinois; why, then, couldn’t history repeat itself? Instead of
each individual community trying to come up with a solution on its own, why not
come together around a shared piece of infrastructure; especially one that was
already built? Through his studies, Adelmann had seen firsthand the power of the
man-made environment to shape a region’s image, and with the I&M Canal, he
was determined to make his vision a reality. "He was the only guy in the whole
Chicago area,” a Tribune journalist would later write, “who saw the potential in
making a major recreational area out of an industrial junkyard."60
A Stroke of Good Fortune
As it turned out, Mr. Adelmann was not the first to express interest in the
old, broken-down canal corridor. Judith Stockdale, executive director of the Open
Lands Project, a non-profit agency devoted to preserving open space in the
Chicago area, had been trying for years to figure out what to do with it.61 The
resources of the canal were intriguing, but the surrounding area was simply too
developed and built-up to be considered for a traditional public park. Even worse,
each community and business along the canal seemed to have its own, conflicting

59 Aldemann, Op. Cit.
60 Grant Pick, “Persistent preservationist clears paths,” Crain’s Chicago Business. 25 September
1989. Web. 11 January 2011.
61 Ibid.
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ideas about how to use it. Thus, by 1979, when Ms. Stockdale received word of
possible new grant money coming in from Washington, all thoughts of the canal
had left her mind. “I had no idea of what project to apply for," she would later
recall, "but the very next day, I got a call from this person named Jerry
Adelmann.”62
Adelmann convinced Open Lands to take a second look at the canal and
its surrounding townships. A national park, he admitted, was infeasible. The very
idea of the federal government trying to preserve a bunch of used car lots and
industrial waste sites was laughable at best. Still, he argued, what if the canal
were to adopt a new way of looking at things? Instead of landscape preservation,
why not focus on landscape creation?63 If townships had a common theme to rally
around, then perhaps enough social and economic capital could be generated to
get things flowing again. All along the canal, he explained, there were hidden
gems of prosperity, both natural and historic, just waiting to be discovered. By
itself, each little town did not have much to offer, but together, they would be a
force to be reckoned with. For a region long used to being thought of as “the
armpit of Chicago,” the biggest remaining hurdle was to convince these
communities of their own potential.
Spreading the Word: John Husar and the Power of the Bully Pulpit

62 Ibid.
63 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
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John Husar, or “Big John,” was a large, thirty-ish man with a sunny
disposition and a deep, infectious laugh. He worked as a sports and recreation
reporter at the Chicago Tribune, and it was said that he could write about
“anything, anywhere, with clarity, brilliance and above all, zeal.”64 An avid
outdoorsman, he had an almost child-like reverence for the natural beauty of
Illinois; a reverence which, when combined with his knack for storytelling, could
move even the most idle of readers. In other words, he was exactly the sort of man
Jerry Adelmann needed to promote the cause of the Illinois and Michigan canal.
Early in 1980, Adelmann, now employed by Open Lands, approached the
boisterous writer with a modest request for assistance. What he got was a
commitment so impressive that it would forge the bonds of a 20-year-long
friendship.
“Jerry, I’m gonna work with you on a series,” the newspaperman declared,

leaving little room for equivocation. “It’s gonna take three months and it’s gonna
be in depth. I have the power of the ‘bully pulpit’ and I know most of the major
players… would you be willing to work with me?”65
For most of the spring and summer, the two men rambled across the Des
Plaines River Valley, surveying properties and talking with local stakeholders. In
September, their efforts were rewarded with a five-part Chicago Tribune series

64 Bob Vendi, A Voice in Our Wilderness: John Husar’s Timeless Writings on the Outdoors,
Strange Meals, and Life’s Simple Moments (Chicago: Triumph Books, 2004) Foreward: xi.
65 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
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titled “Illinois: Our Hidden Wilderness,” which received critical acclaim and was
featured on several front pages.66 The region, it seemed, was finally becoming
proud of itself again.
Meanwhile, in Washington DC, Open Lands had managed to convince a
sympathetic park service official by the name of John Piene to help formulate a
management plan for the new project.67 In just a few short months, the corridor
idea would be ready to share with the general public. First, though, it would have
to be pitched to a much less receptive audience.
Convincing Businesses
In mid-20th century America, there was a distinct sense that the ideal of
preservation was in conflict with the reality of innovation, and that a community
could embrace one or the other but certainly not both.68 As such, most
businessmen had developed a keen and visceral distrust of any agency seeking to
“look after” or “interpret” their land. This distrust was directed towards
government, but also towards non-governmental agencies like Open Lands,
whose stated mission was to preserve and protect the natural landscape of Illinois.
In fact, just ten years earlier, Open Lands had earned the ire of local
businessmen by lobbying against construction on Mooselake Prairie, a prime
66 John Husar, “Illinois: Our Hidden Wilderness,” Chicago Tribune. 25 September 1980. Web. 15
January 2011.
67 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
68 Ibid.

31

patch of real estate just south of Joliet.69 Not surprisingly, when a couple of selfdescribed “wide-eyed zealots” came rolling into town a decade later and
announced their plans for a new regional park, the business community did not
exactly welcome them with open arms. “There was a real sense,” Adelmann
recalled, “that we were just some wealthy Chicagoans coming down and trying to
tell them what to do….you know, that we were stealing their land under cover of
darkness.”70

A series of corporate-sponsored breakfasts in Chicago, organized to
mollify the concerns of big business, did not fare any better. "The reaction was
chilly to hostile," remembered George Overton, president of Open Lands.71
With factories closing and unemployment skyrocketing, the last thing
companies wanted to hear about was more regulation and more government
control. Faced with a difficult situation, Adelmann and Open Lands decided to
create a spin-off organization to help bolster their cause. Originally called the
Upper Illinois Valley Association (UIVA), its job was to bring together
various members of the business community and convince them that, far from
preventing innovation, a new heritage corridor would actively encourage it.

Day after day, proponents of the corridor hammered away at the same
message: the designation would not impose any new land use or environmental
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Grant Pick, Op. Cit.
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controls. No land would be owned, and all preservation efforts would be
strictly voluntary in nature. This was a kinder and gentler form of preservation,
they argued; one that was not at all opposed to progress or free enterprise.72 In
other words, this was not your grandfather’s national park.

During the summer and fall of 1981, Adelmann and the National Park
Service worked hard to create a proposal that would be acceptable to everyone
involved. As the months dragged on, a few key themes began to emerge.
Unlike national parks, partnership and cooperation would be key. The NPS
would help with funding and technical matters, but all policy initiatives would
originate on the ground. This way, local groups could have real influence over
the governing commission, which would be split evenly between government,
business, and non-profit sectors. Over time, this openness to all viewpoints
began to win over many earlier detractors. Unlike previous activists, they
noted, Adelmann didn’t come across as some sort of fanatic.73 One Chicago
CEO, marveling at this newfound truce between businessmen and
environmentalists, observed smugly that, “This [kind of thing] could never
happen in a place like Russia.”74

72 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
73 Linda Legner, “A National Park Here? Why Not, says Chicago’s Super Salesman,” Historic
Preservation. 2 April 1982. Web. 12 January 2011.
74 US Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water, Hearing on S.2157: To
establish the Illinois and Michigan Canal National Heritage Corridor in Illinois, and an Interior
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As 1981 gave way to 1982, a small but growing segment of the
business community had placed itself firmly behind the project. The UIVA
board began to fill up with CEOs and presidents from some of America’s
largest corporations. Caterpillar Tractor, Amoco Chemical and Inland Steel
were just a few of the big names that attached themselves to the project.75 In
doing so, these manufacturing giants signaled their belief that the corridor
could regain its former glory, and that all it needed was a change of image.

“Image and quality of life are among the most important concerns for the
retention of industry,” wrote Inland Steel VP George Ranney in a 1982 op-ed,
“The improved amenities will help attract residents and jobs.”76 Indeed, according
to the calculations of the Three Rivers Manufacturing Company, a new heritage
corridor would directly create 700 jobs and leverage almost a million extra dollars
in federal and state taxes.77 Just from the publicity alone, they argued, Illinois
manufacturing could be put back on the map. As one executive would later say,
''It was a good idea for business. We were competing for employees with other
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geographic areas. Certainly the environment and the vision for the future (of the
area) had some role in attracting people.''78
By the spring of 1982, virtually everyone with a say in the matter was
behind the heritage corridor proposal.79 The previous October, Open Lands and
the NPS had released an official proposal, and a revised form of the plan was
already being drafted for introduction to Congress. For the bill’s supporters,
however, the hardest road still lay ahead. With the exception of John Piene and a
few of his colleagues, support from the park service was lukewarm at best.80 The
Interior Department, with its ongoing budget-slashing measures, promised to be
an even tougher sell. Somehow, proponents of the plan would have to convince an
anti-environmentalist, anti-bureaucratic administration that a heritage area would
be a good idea. Luckily, over the past few months, advocates for the canal
corridor had managed to gain some powerful political allies.
Senator Charles Percy: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed
When freshman senator Charles Percy of Illinois was introduced to the
public in the mid 1960s, it was, by all accounts, a case of love at first sight.
Young, handsome, and charismatic, the Senate’s new golden boy was seen as the
Republican’s answer to the Kennedys. In 1968, just two years into his first term,
he was briefly considered for the vice-presidential slot under then-candidate
78 Rich Hein and Robert Davis, “Corridor Connects Portrait of Past, Vision of Future,” Chicago
Sun-Times. 13 November 1994. Web. 15 January 2011.

79 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
80 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
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Richard Nixon. Six years later, after Watergate cleared the republican field, there
was even talk of Percy himself ascending to the highest office.81
As the years wore on, however, much of Percy’s luster began to fade. As
ranking member and later Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Percy was criticized for spending more time in Cairo, Egypt, than in Cairo,
Illinois.82 There was a strong sense, Adelmann recalled, that Percy had begun to
lose touch with his constituency. While people back home were struggling with a
sinking economy, Percy was spending his time abroad, rubbing shoulders with
blue-blooded aristocrats at fancy state dinners. If Percy wanted to be re-elected,
he soon realized, he would need to start bringing home the bacon; and with
challengers already lining up, there was little time to waste.
Although he himself was preoccupied with foreign affairs, Percy
appointed a young aide by the name of Jim Keene to scour Illinois for potential
spending projects. Luckily for Open Lands, Keene happened to be one of John
Husar’s many “connections,” and after a brief tour of the canal region, the young
staffer was sold. Almost immediately, Senator Percy latched onto the project with
a ferocity that only a politician in trouble can muster. Somewhat awkwardly,
Percy was joined in his endeavor by republican Representative Tom Corcoran, his
rumored challenger in the upcoming primary campaign. Together, the two men

81 Steve Neal, “Percy Adored and Endeared, but was Nagged by Career as Might-Have-Been,”
Chicago Tribune. 13 January 1985. Web. 13 January 2011.
82 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
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formed a powerful lobbying front, and it was they who set up the pivotal meeting
with Secretary Watt in August of 1982.
The Big Sell
Realizing the potential difficulty of asking for a new government project
in the midst of a recession, the Illinois delegation made a daring move. Instead of
trying to get Watt and company to act against their will, they would attempt to
convince them that the plan was actually in the best interests of the federal
government.
The heritage corridor, they declared, was the epitome of New Federalism,
and therefore symbolized everything that the new administration was fighting for.
The plan, they argued, was “efficient,” “cost-cutting,” and “locally controlled”; all
buzz words in the new federalist lexicon.83 Unlike a national park, which required
millions of dollars of assistance and a huge federal staff, the proposed heritage
corridor would ask for a mere 250,000 dollars a year, plus expenses for brochures
and other promotional material.84 More importantly, the plan promised to give a
boost to some of America’s largest corporations, an effect that certainly would be
felt beyond the borders of Illinois. If the plan was successful, they concluded, then
the old model of heavy-handed park service intervention was dead; an outcome
that all true conservatives could celebrate.
Despite all this high-powered lobbying and careful planning, most
observers were nevertheless surprised when Watt emerged from the August
83 US Senate, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water, Op. Cit., 196.
84 “The I&M Canal, A Park for all Tastes: Personal View of George Ranney Jr.,” Op. Cit.
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meeting and declared the plan to be “a bold, precedent-setting concept” worthy of
his full support.85 In fact, Watt’s support was so enthusiastic that it nearly scared
away some of the bill’s liberal backers. Eventually, however, the bill’s supporters
managed to walk the political tightrope and shepherd the bill through Congress
without significant opposition.86
A Dream Come True: The Nation’s First Heritage Area
Shortly after 2:30 pm on August 24, 1984, President Regan strode into the
grand ballroom of the Chicago Conrad Hilton, flanked by a quartet of smiling
Illinois representatives. Briefly pausing to ink his signature, Regan praised the
new corridor as a model of cooperation, stating, “We believe this activity will
stimulate tourism, jobs, and economic growth, as well as greater cooperation
between local, State, and Federal Governments.”87 After five years of stress and
uncertainty, the vision of Jerry Adelmann had finally become a reality.

With its designation, the I&M Canal Corridor quickly would become a
living testament to the powers of regional thinking. By creating partnerships
between traditionally antagonistic factions, the corridor had proved that old
political and economic divisions could be transcended in the name of
geographic unity. As Adelmann would put it several years later, “The corridor
created a new ethic and a new way of thinking about planning in this
85 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
86 Ibid.
87 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on Signing a Bill To Commemorate the Illinois and Michigan Canal,”
Public Papers of Ronald Reagan: Univ. of Texas Archive. 6 October 2009. Web. 7 January 2011.
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community. It is a region today, and it never was.''88 Additionally, by treating
the federal government as a “stimulating agent” rather than as a sole provider
of wealth, the corridor had been able to win the backing of an administration
largely opposed to more traditional means of government assistance. Now,
officially designated as a heritage area, the I&M Canal could begin the long
process of retooling its economy along lines more conducive to 21st century
success (Appendix, Figure 4).

In the four years following this first designation, three more regions would
join the ranks of the heritage area movement. In 1986, the Blackstone River
Valley Corridor was approved by Congress, encompassing the area between
Providence, Rhode Island and Worcester, Massachusetts. Two years later,
Pennsylvania would receive two heritage areas of its own, one near Pittsburgh and
the other near Philadelphia. Like the I&M Canal, these three new heritage areas
all were struggling industrial areas, and like the I&M Canal, they all hoped to
build a sense of shared regional ethic around a common historical theme.89
However, as late as the early 1990s, the heritage area program was still
somewhat of a nebulous concept. As one park service official would later recall,
“The first few, I think, were arguably experimental. It was a new concept and I

88 Rich Hein and Robert Davis, Op. Cit.
89 Heather Scotten, Op. Cit.
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am not sure Congress knew exactly what they were doing.”90 In other words,
while these regions believed in the benefits of cooperation, they weren’t yet sure
what those benefits would be. New regionalism was an appealing concept, but it
lacked the hard, empirical evidence needed to back up its claims of financial
effectiveness.
As the decade unfolded, however, a remarkable new development in the
world of tourism would begin to lend a sense of drive and purpose to a program
badly in need of direction.

90 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing on S.311: To Conduct Oversight on the
Designation and Management of Heritage Areas, Op. Cit., 5.
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Chapter 3: Profiting From the Past
“Marketing battles are not fought in the customer’s office or in the supermarkets
or the drugstores of America. Marketing battles are fought in a mean and ugly
place. A place that’s dark and damp with much unexpected territory and deep
pitfalls to trap the unwary. Marketing battles are fought inside the mind.”
-

Al Ries and Jack Trout, “Marketing Warfare,” 1986

Tourism, of course, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the idea of
travelling to other places in order to gain a sense of enjoyment, fulfillment, or
wonder is at least as old as recorded civilization itself. However, during the last
half of the 20th century, tourism would be transformed from an innate human
tendency into a multi-billion dollar global industry.91 Moreover, in the United
States, as a new generation of baby boomers matured, tourism would assume a
much more emotional quality than it had in the past. In an increasingly complex
world, many people would begin to search for meaning and authenticity in the
places that they visited. In effect, these travelers hoped to return to their roots, and
they would be willing to pay a significant amount of money to do it.

As these new trends in tourism became widely accepted, the heritage area
movement gained an important source of economic legitimacy. Already imbued
with clearly defined themes and shared visions of the past, many heritage areas

91 A detailed look at the development of modern tourism in the Western Hemisphere can be
found in Hartmut Berghoff, The Making of Modern Tourism: The Cultural History of the British
Experience, 1600-2000 (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2002)
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found themselves in a prime position to begin selling their image to these
prospective new tourists. By using their existing network of grassroots activists,
they felt they could leverage the relatively limited assistance of the National Park
Service and turn it into a much greater source of revenue. Suddenly, a program
which had seemed limited in scope now seemed limitless in possibility.

An Unexpected Development

During the early 1990s, observers began to notice a remarkable trend
occurring amongst the nation’s four existing heritage areas. Heavy industry had
not returned, at least not to the degree hoped for by some of the program’s
original planners.92 However, in its place, a new wave of tourists had come
rushing in, infusing fresh life into previously struggling economies. While tourism
had always been a goal of the heritage area project, its stimulating effects were
developing much sooner and much more powerfully than almost anyone had
expected.

In the nine short years between 1983 and 1992, tourism revenues in the
Blackstone River Valley Heritage Corridor skyrocketed, from $76 million to
nearly $200 million.93 Polluted rivers were slowly improving, new jobs were
pouring in by the hundreds, and morale was higher than it had been in decades. In
northeastern Illinois, a similar phenomenon had revived the fortunes of the Illinois
92 Adelmann, Op. Cit.
93 Gail Hulbert, “I Sell the Real New England,” Providence Journal-Bulletin. 12 September 1995.
Web. 1 February 2011.
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and Michigan Canal region. By the mid-1990s, an estimated five million tourists
were visiting the heritage corridor every year, helping to fund a wide array of
downtown revitalization projects.94 “I used to think people [in the new areas of
town] didn’t even know there was a downtown,” quipped Bruce Szafraniec, a
Lemont retailer, in a 1992 Chicago Sun-Times article, “now I look out on the
street on Saturday and wonder, 'Where are all these people coming from?'"95

In what can only be described as an incredible stroke of good fortune, the
heritage corridor project had managed to stumble across an emerging trend much
larger than anything its original planners could have imagined. With the simple
act of authorization, heritage areas had tapped into a deep undercurrent of desire
within the American psyche; a desire for simplicity, authenticity, and above all,
meaning.

An Inexplicable Yearning: Baby Boomers and the Search for Enlightenment

After a brief challenge during the late 60s and early 70s, consumer culture
in America had come roaring back with a vengeance during the 1980s.96 Baby
boomers, no longer the fresh-faced idealists of decades past, were now faced with
the challenges of middle age: holding down jobs, paying mortgages, and raising

94 Rich Hein and Robert Davis, Op. Cit.
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February 1992. Web. 31 January 2011.
96 Don Slater, “Consumer Culture and Modernity,” in Consumer Culture and Modernity
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997) 8-33.
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families. For most, the idea of open rebellion against the existing economic and
social order was unthinkable, the relic of a naïve and long-forgotten youth. And
yet, even as baby boomers grew to accept the realities of the modern world, the
relationship was never an easy one. In their desire to escape the monotony of
everyday existence, many baby boomers found themselves challenging the system
in small but meaningful ways.97 While their duties at the workplace were nonnegotiable and their responsibilities at home inescapable, their leisure time was
theirs alone to do as they pleased. Vacations, in particular, offered baby boomers
a chance to mix things up and rediscover some of the magic of their adolescence.

For those in search of deeper social and cultural meaning, the traditional
vacation hotspots of the 1980s had little if anything to offer. Week-long getaways
to theme parks and island resorts were pleasurable, but to many, they represented
a mere extension of the faceless, commercialized world from which they had
fled.98 In order to truly put the mind at ease, vacations needed to excite the spirit
along with the senses. As one vacation planner put it, “We need to go back to our
roots and understand what makes us unique and what makes up our heritage. We
need to see beautiful places and do authentic things.”99

97 David Brooks, “Why Bobos Rule: Blending the Rebellion of the 60s with the Materialism of the
80s,” Newsweek. 3 April 2000. 65
98 For a more nuanced look at the link between changing cultural attitudes and vacation
planning, see Richard Prentice, Tourism and Heritage Attractions (New York: Routledge, 1993).
99 Dan Rowe, “Heritage Tourism Heats Up in Georgia: Initiative Fans the Flames of History As
Tourists Flock to Georgia,” The Georgia Trust. 15 October 2003. Web. 29 January 2011.
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This paradigm shift in vacation planning, from the pleasure-seeking to the
spiritual and knowledge-seeking, was remarkably swift. In 1982, Travel and
Leisure Magazine commissioned a poll asking travelers to list what was important
to them when planning a trip. A mere 27% of respondents listed “Visiting
cultural, historical, and archeological treasures” as important motivators. Ten
years later, however, the polling agency conducted a follow-up survey which
showed that number nearly doubling to 50%. Even more striking, the proportion
identifying “understanding culture” as a major component of vacation planning
jumped from just 48% to 88%.100

As more and more studies confirmed this trend from escapism towards
personal enrichment, some very important people began to take notice. In an
ironic twist of fate, a movement heavily opposed to consumerism and
commercialism would end up serving the needs of a tourism industry hungry for
profit.

Cultural Heritage Tourism

During the 1990s, the phrase “cultural heritage tourism” was developed to
describe these recent trends in vacation planning. At the time, the growth of this
new niche market was more than double that of the rest of the tourism industry,
which itself was one of the fastest emerging sectors of the global economy.

100 Gail D. Lord, “The Power of Cultural Heritage Tourism,” Keynote Presentation: Wisconsin
Heritage Tourism Conference, Lac Du Flambeau, Wisconsin. 17 September 1999. Web. 15
February 2011. 4.
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Defined as “people who travel to experience places, artifacts, and activities that
authentically represent the stories and people of the past,” cultural heritage
tourists were seen as a new breed of traveler; one with intense loyalty and a
remarkable propensity to spend.101

In 1997, a study by the Traveler’s Association of America showed that
cultural heritage tourists spent an average of $615 per trip compared to $425 for
all other tourists.102 Another study in Virginia returned similar results, showing
that heritage travelers stayed, on average, one-and-a-half times longer, visited
twice as many places, and spent two-and-a-half times as much money.103 Not
surprisingly, cultural heritage tourists tended to be older, wealthier, better
educated, and had more free time. Perhaps most importantly, heritage tourists
were shown to be highly passionate and self-motivated, needing little in the way
of outside prodding to explore their surroundings. "It’s different creature than
regular tourism," remarked Carole Summers, cultural heritage tourism coordinator
for the Kentucky Department of Travel. "They [the tourists] will drive through
miles of back roads just to find a fried bologna sandwich at a general store

101 “Heritage Tourism,” National Trust For Historic Preservation. 10 October 2010. Web.
Retrieved 4 February 2011.
102 Sarah Nicholls, et. al., “Heeding the Call for Heritage Tourism: More Visitors Want an
‘Experience’ in their Vacations – Something a Historical Park can Provide,” Parks and Recreation
39 (2004) 42.
103 Joni Leithe and Patricia Tigue, “Profiting From the Past: The Economic Impact of Historic
Preservation in Georgia,” Georgia Department of Natural Resources (1999). Web. 4 February
2011. 7.
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somewhere."104 In short, cultural heritage tourists were the tourism industry’s best
friend.

As the decade progressed, more studies were released showing the real,
on-the-ground benefits of cultural heritage tourism. In Georgia alone,
rehabilitation of historic properties between 1992 and 1996 created 7,550 jobs,
$201 million in earnings, and $559 million in total economic impact.105 In
Florida, total annual in-state wealth creation from heritage travelers was estimated
to be over $4 billion,106 and in Colorado, the state tourism board calculated that
every dollar spent on tourism leveraged an extra 12 in revenue.107 The industry
was especially appealing to rural areas, which did not have the technological or
labor capital needed to sustain other forms of economic revitalization.

For regions hoping to obtain the benefits of heritage tourism, however,
there were some organization hurdles standing in the way of success. For one, in
order to attract visitors, communities would need to develop an entire network of
coherent and well-organized themes; themes which were broad enough to appeal
to a wide audience but distinctive enough to stand out from the crowd. In a world

104 "Region Hopes to Lure Tourists to Cultural Sites," Kentucky Post. 29 April 2000. Web. 13
February 2011.
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where consumers were faced with increasing product choice but decreasing
decision time, this ability to differentiate was seen as a key necessity in the
advertising world.108 Thus, in order to cut through the “commercial clutter” and
reach the mind of the consumer, tourist destinations would have to provide a
message that was both unique and memorable. In the words of Stephen Pike, a
senior lecturer at the Queensland School of Tourism, the most important question
for a region to ask itself was, “What experiences can we offer that the consumer
can’t find anywhere else?”109

In addition to uniqueness, heritage tourist destinations would need to be
perceived as authentic. This obsession of tourists to get behind the scenes and
“observe the real thing” was seen by many academics as the outgrowth of an
economy based on personalization and customization.110 To heritage tourists, the
prime reason to travel was to gain personal insight and enlightenment, and this
could only be done in places that had been left unspoiled by the clumsy hands of
commercialism. Thus, the minute a place became “discovered” and

108 Ibid., 43.
109 Ibid., 43.
110 For further discussion on this topic, see Joseph Pine and James Gilmore, “Welcome to the
Experience Economy,” Harvard Business Review (July-August, 1998) 97-105.
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“commoditized,” it would lose its personal meaning, therefore becoming
undesirable.111

Finally, new studies were beginning to show that heritage tourists were
repelled by traditional, top-down methods of learning. According to Richard
Prentice, an early pioneer in heritage tourism theory, regions could not hope to
“teach” their history to prospective visitors. Instead, they would need to
encourage a more individualized approach to learning, allowing the visitor “to
discover ‘hidden’ worlds, to seek adventure, to admire grandeur, to share secrets,
to sample flavors and to uncover mysteries.”112 In this sense, host regions were
not seen as educators, but rather as coequal partners in the search for personal
enlightenment. As one travel agent put it, the message of a community would
have to change from “What can I do for you?” to “What can we do together?”113

In trying to fulfill these three requirements of distinctiveness, genuineness,
and interactivity, heritage tourism destinations were faced with somewhat of a
paradox. They needed to sell themselves enough to get the consumer’s attention,
but not enough to destroy the consumer’s image of untarnished authenticity. It
was a fine line to walk, and it required a high degree of cooperation and
collaboration among all the stakeholders within a region. In the past, local hotels,
111 Rebecca Ruiz, “How Authentic is Your Vacation,” Forbes Magazine. 18 June 2008. Web. 21
February 2011.
112 Richard Prentice, Op. Cit., 17.
113 Kathleen Purvis, “Old Is In: Small Towns Cash In On Age with Heritage Tourism,” Charlotte
Observer. 5 September 1999. Web. 1 April 2011.
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museums, and parks could simply worry about maintaining their own specificallytailored images. Now, with entire regions being sold as “package deals,” each
individual business would have to rely upon a much larger, community-wide
message.114 In this new climate, a region’s thematic coherence was only as strong
as its weakest link, and the ability to cooperate and collaborate was seen as vital.

Heritage Areas: A Natural Fit for Heritage Tourists

While other communities would have to build these partnerships from the
ground up, heritage areas already had much of the necessary framework in place.
During their drive to attain designation, heritage areas like the I&M Canal
Corridor had already gone through the process of organizing various interests
around a common historical theme. With their focus on regional cooperation,
heritage areas had attained, in the words of one researcher, a “coherence of story,
genre, style, credibility, and depth” that other, more fractured localities found
difficult to match.115 Just as importantly, heritage areas had already gained the
backing of the National Park Service, a well-known and highly respected agency.

114 Martina G. Gallarza, “Destination Image: Towards a Conceptual Framework,” Annals of
Tourism Research 29 (2002) 58.
115 Debi Hayes and Nicola MacLeod, “Packaging Places: Maximizing the Potential of the
Heritage Trail by Adopting an Experience Economy Perspective,” Journal of Vacation Marketing
13 (2007) 53.
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For many regions, this support acted as a crucial “seal of approval,” lending a
certain degree of credibility to their claims of national significance.116

Considering this, it is no surprise that the first four heritage areas
experienced an increase in tourism during the early 1990s. Almost without
realizing it, they had managed to create a model perfectly suited to fit the
demands of a new and increasingly popular national phenomenon.

Tourism: A New Lease on Life for the Heritage Area Movement

During a phone call with one high-level heritage area administrator, I
asked him why tourism was such an attractive economic opportunity for many
regions. The administrator, who asked to remain anonymous, paused thoughtfully
before replying:

Well, you get people that come from out of state, they open their wallet, they leave
all their money here, and then they go home. They’re not part of the tax burden,
their kids aren’t going to the school systems, their stuff isn’t going into the septic
systems, but they’re leaving their money here.

In other words, heritage tourism can be a real-life example of the benefits
of new regionalism. In an era of scarce resources, tourism can offer a new chance
for struggling communities to begin revitalizing themselves. By attracting

116 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing on S.956: To Implement Designation
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travelers from other regions, communities can gain revenue from increased
visitation without having to pay the costs of an expanded population. In many
cases then, heritage tourism is a zero-sum game played out along spatial lines; the
more a region functions as a team, the better it can compete in the race to attract
visitors.

As the 1990s progressed, many communities would start to embrace this
idea of enhanced economic competitiveness through regional cooperation. During
the 1980s, regional heritage planning had been limited in scope and focused
almost exclusively upon industrial areas. Now, however, the demand for these
new “thematic parks” would begin to sweep across the country. Of these new
parks, many were designated at the state or local levels.117 However, the largest
and most desirable designations were still those at the national level, an exclusive
domain of the National Heritage Area program.118

Of these regions attempting to gain national designation, only a few were
industrial areas with clearly defined regional histories like the I&M Canal. Others
were more rural in nature and therefore did not share the same legacies as the first
four heritage areas.119 Most intriguing, however, were the group of applicants
with no regional identity at all; these communities wished to gain the benefits of
117 An example of a state-level heritage area program can be found in “Explore the past; look
into the future in state heritage areas,” NY State Office of Parks, Recreation, and Historic
Preservation. 8 August 2008. Web. 25 February 2011.
118 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.
119 Ibid.
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regional organization and heritage tourism, but did not have a coherent theme
with which to market themselves. As a group of towns in eastern Connecticut
would soon prove, however, this deficiency in regional identity was no barrier to
designation. When faced with a distinct lack of existing historical narratives, the
solution was simple: just create one.
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Chapter 4: The Greatest Story Never Told
The Remarkable Tale of The Last Green Valley

“I can't imagine a nicer place to get lost in, or to fall off the map while
springtime emerges all around. A string of lovely little towns hung together like cool New
England pearls, the Last Green Valley is paradise on Earth….and not a mall in sight.”

- Annie Graves (Yankee Magazine)
Tucked quietly among the green, rolling hills of eastern Connecticut and
South-Central Massachusetts lays one of the most successful federal programs in
recent memory (Appendix, Figure 5). Formally known as the Quinebaug and
Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage Corridor (QSNRVHC), the region is
more commonly identified by its friendlier and less imposing nickname: “The
Last Green Valley of New England.”120
For almost any other place, such a grandiose title might come across as
overdramatic or cliché, but for the Last Green Valley (LGV), the name seems
oddly appropriate. Indeed, upon visiting the corridor’s official website, one
cannot help but be impressed by the breathtaking array of photos displayed there.
From grassy meadows to freshly tilled hay fields and fog-shrouded forests, these
photos invoke a powerful sense of pastoral nostalgia in the viewer, an effect made
all the more poignant by a satellite image displayed on the website’s main page.
120 “What is the Last Green Valley,” The Last Green Valley, Inc. 10 December 2010. Web. 13
March 2011.
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Taken at night, the photo shows the entire Northeastern Seaboard as one
continuous chain of artificial light, unbroken except for a tiny island of darkness
in eastern Connecticut; an island of unspoiled beauty within a sea of encroaching
modernity (Appendix, Figure 6).
To a traveler on the ground, the effect of entering the Last Green Valley is
just as impressive. After the noisy cities and exhaust-choked interstates of
Southern New England, the so-called “quiet corner” of Connecticut is a welcome
relief. Even the people there seem more easygoing and community-oriented than
their neighbors to the west, a stereotype that they are more than happy to
perpetuate. Every year, this community spirit is put on proud display during the
popular “Walktober” festival, an event which draws upwards of 20,000 people
from both within and beyond regional borders.121 There are nature walks, canoe
expeditions, hay rides, food tasting, and dozens of walking tours of famous
landmarks. There are paintings, brochures, and even a “Last Green Valley
anthem”; a folksy ballad that sounds as if it was written at least a hundred years
ago.122 In fact, the whole region itself feels like some sort of anachronism, a
throwback to a time when places had meaning and people had roots.
If all this doesn’t sound familiar, it should. In offering a place for weary
travelers to escape from the trappings of modernity, the Last Green Valley is an
example of cultural heritage tourism at its finest. However, far from being a relic
121 “Walktober 2010 Brochure,” The Last Green Valley, Inc. (Danielson, CT, 2010). Print.
122 Bill Reid, Director of External Affairs, LGV Inc. Telephone Interview, 3 April 2009.
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of the past, the LGV (a name which wasn’t coined until 1993) is a symbol of the
future. Before designation as a heritage corridor, the towns of eastern Connecticut
and southern Massachusetts had little sense of shared history. In fact, rather than
reflect a common heritage, the corridor was established to create one, primarily as
a means of achieving economic stability. Initiated in 1994, the Last Green Valley
marked the beginning of a new era in heritage area planning; an era where reality
was no obstacle to the formation of image. More than anything, the Last Green
Valley showed that, with a lot of planning and a little imagination, there was
literally no limit to what a group of hard-working towns could achieve.
The Rust Belt Comes to Connecticut
For most Americans, the end of the Cold War was cause for celebration,
but for workers in the defense industry, it was a sign that their jobs might soon be
in jeopardy.123 During the Reagan administration, military spending had escalated
at a rapid rate, creating opportunities for manufacturers of weapons, armored
vehicles, and surveillance systems. Eastern Connecticut, in particular, had
benefitted greatly during this period, where it was estimated that one out of every
three jobs was directly dependent on the defense industry.124 Now, in the wake of
proposed budget cuts by George Bush Sr., Connecticut was destined to experience

123 For a more detailed look at the defense industry after the Cold War, see Eugene Gholz and
Harvey Sapolsky, “Restructuring the US Defense Industry,” International Security 24 (1999) 5-51.
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a major slowdown in its economy. Among those aware of the impending crisis,
perhaps none were more nervous than eastern Connecticut’s lone representative in
Congress, four-term Democrat Sam Gejdenson.
Several years earlier, during the Republican tidal wave of 1984,
Gejdenson had been labeled as an opponent of Connecticut’s defense industry, an
accusation which had nearly cost him the election.125 Now, with the prospects of
new economic discontent on the horizon, Gejdenson was determined not to be
caught off guard once again. Together with Senator Joe Lieberman, he organized
a congressional hearing on the economic future of Connecticut, a hearing which
concluded that job losses in the manufacturing sector were unavoidable.126 In
order to prosper, Connecticut would need to diversify and find new areas for
potential growth. Luckily for Gejdenson, there was one sector of the economy that
was showing surprising strength, and it was there that he focused his efforts as the
next election approached.

Build it and they will Come: Connecticut Tourism in the post-Cold War era
Throughout most of the 20th century, eastern Connecticut was an
afterthought in the minds of New England tourists. Those seeking culture and

125 Richard Madden, “In 2nd District, Diversity of Voters is Challenge to Candidates,” New York
Times. 30 September 1984. Web. 31 March 2009.
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history went to Boston or Newport and those seeking natural beauty went to the
White Mountains or the Maine coast. Eastern Connecticut was written off as New
England’s “quiet corner,” a reputation which tended to dissuade potential
visitors.127 In the late 1980s, however, things began to change. An increasing
number of travelers, many of them early cultural heritage tourists, began to
“discover” the attractions of rural Connecticut. Unlike the more well-known areas
of New England, eastern Connecticut hadn’t been overrun by tourists and
commercial industries. Savvy travelers, always searching for the next big “off the
beaten path” destination, saw rural Connecticut as the perfect place to shop, hike,
or just relax. In many ways, the region’s lack of major attractions was is biggest
attraction.128
Representative Gejdenson was among the first to notice this trend.
“Tourism is the one segment of the economy in eastern Connecticut that is
growing,” he would later explain in front of Congress, “in part because we offer
the New England atmosphere which so many hope to experience but which is
increasingly difficult to find.”129 The question was: How could eastern
Connecticut turn this modest trickle of tourism into a steady flow of revenue?

127 Bill Reid, Op. Cit.
128 Ibid.
129 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, Committee on
Natural Resources, Hearing on S. 589: To establish the Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley
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Gejdenson’s original answer was simple, and in April of 1988, he took his
case to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Connecticut, he
explained, had the lowest proportion of publicly owned land in America. If the
federal government would simply assist the state in creating a new system of
parks and recreation areas, Connecticut could vastly improve the quality of life of
its citizens while also attracting new visitors. The National Park Service, however,
was not convinced. According to the organization’s regional director, federal
management of open lands would be “counterproductive and costly to the
taxpayer.”130 Connecticut would need to find a different way forward.
It is unclear from the record exactly when Gejdenson arrived at his
decision to turn eastern Connecticut into a heritage corridor. The Blackstone
River Valley Corridor, situated directly east of Gejdenson’s own district, was a
likely source of inspiration. So too was the I&M Canal Corridor, which
Gejdenson had voted for during his second term in office. Either way, by the
spring of 1989, Gejdenson’s plans were set, and unlike past heritage corridor
proposals, this time the private sector lent its immediate support. A heritage
corridor, they agreed, was the perfect opportunity for isolated towns to begin
working together towards common goals. “Alone, we lack the resources to
produce a coherent plan,” testified John D. Boland, chairman of the advisory
committee established to investigate the matter, “in partnership with one another,

130 US House, Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations, Op. Cit. 224.
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however, our strength is multiplied.”131 In fact, the plan seemed so good that it
was easy to overlook its one glaring weakness; in order to have a heritage area,
one first needed to have a heritage.
Breaking the Mold: An Odd Fit for a Heritage Corridor
During a phone call with Bill Reid, the Director of External Affairs for
the Last Green Valley Inc., I asked him if the towns of eastern Connecticut had
shared any sense of regional identity before their incorporation as a National
Heritage Area. After two or three seconds of thoughtful silence, he slowly replied,
“Well…no, not really.”
Indeed, at the time of Gejdenson’s proposal, Connecticut was arguably
the least regionalized state in the nation. By 1960, it had abolished all forms of
county government, joining Rhode Island as the only state without functioning
regional jurisdictions.132 Each township was largely self-sufficient, a reflection of
that old “Yankee spirit of independence” so cherished by New Englanders. As for
heritage, it was difficult to find one narrative that all towns could agree on. Some
traced their history back to the early mill settlements, while others identified with
a more agricultural past. Even the demography was split; many towns were still
largely blue collar, while others had experienced a recent influx of wealthy

131 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, Committee on
Natural Resources, Hearing on S. 589: To establish the Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley
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urbanites from out of state.133 In short, it would have been difficult to find a group
of towns less suited to take on the challenges of becoming a heritage corridor.
Another potential problem arose from the currently accepted definition of
what a heritage corridor could be. Although there were no written guidelines, all
previous corridors had been heavily industrialized, with high rates of
unemployment. Eastern Connecticut, while certainly a hub for military
manufacturing, was over 70% forested, with unemployment rates well below
10%.134 Thus, unlike past heritage corridors, which simply had been trying to stop
the economic bleeding, Connecticut was trying to jumpstart its economy before
things went downhill. Rather than try and save manufacturing jobs, Connecticut
was hoping to circumvent deindustrialization altogether by focusing its efforts on
an entirely new sector of the economy. In this sense, heritage tourism more than
just a means to achieve a larger end; it was an end.
As the plan for the new heritage corridor began to take shape, its backers
were faced with a difficult situation. In order to receive designation, they would
have to create a sense of shared regional identity where none had existed before,
and, with no similar corridors to act as a blueprint, they would essentially have to
do it in a vacuum.
The Last Green Valley: Building the Legend

133 Richard Madden, Op. Cit.
134 Bill Reid, Op. Cit.

61

On the Last Green Valley’s website, there is an official statement of
distinction which outlines the region’s case for national significance. Residents of
the Quinebaug and Shetucket River Valley (QSRV), it argues, had always known
that they lived in a special place; they just had a hard time explaining why.
Indeed, between 1989 and 1993, the QSRV seemed to embody a different
historical narrative every week. At first, the corridor’s supporters emphasized the
region’s old mills and factories, which they claimed had helped unleash a new age
of American industrialization. Unfortunately, this message was uncomfortably
close to that of the neighboring Blackstone Corridor, which billed itself as the
“Birthplace of the American Industrial Revolution.”135 Unwilling to engage in
such a costly “brand war,” the QSRV decided to develop a more generalized
theme, calling itself “The transition area from ‘Puritan’ ideology to ‘Yankee’
ideology.”136 Unsurprisingly, very few people understood what this actually
meant, and in April of 1993, the National Park Service stepped in to set things
straight. Distressed by the region’s lack of a coherent narrative, it filed a report
stating, “The historic, natural, and recreation resources make the QSRV distinct
from other parts of Connecticut, but do not reflect national significance.”137 It was

135 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands, Committee on
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clear that, in order to gain authorization, the valley would need a much more
compelling story.
Not long after the disappointing NPS report, a breakthrough came in the
form of a 17-year-old document discovered deep within the state archives. Back
in 1976, a commission called the Eastern Connecticut Resource Conservation and
Development Project had conducted a land survey of southern New England. In
their analysis of the data, they had briefly noted that the area between the
Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers was much less developed than the surrounding
territory. In many ways, they noted, the area represented a kind of “last green
valley within the Megalopolis.”138 Nearly two decades later, QSRVNHC Inc., the
main interest group in favor of the corridor, stumbled across the old document
while searching the state records for information. After years of indecisiveness,
the group finally had found the theme it was looking for.
The name, they agreed, was perfect. In just four words, it captured
everything that had made the region attractive to heritage tourists in the first
place. It implied authenticity. Green valleys were places of natural beauty,
untouched by the corrupting forces of modernism. It also implied uniqueness. As
“the last” of its kind, visitors were assured that they wouldn’t be able to find a
similar experience anywhere else. More than anything, however, the name
implied vulnerability; a sense of being under siege from outside forces beyond the

138 “Vision to Reality: A Management Plan,” Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley
National Heritage Corridor Advisory Council. 1 Aug. 1997. Web. 25 March 2009.
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region’s control. For all those hoping to catch a glimpse of unspoiled New
England, the name offered a kind of ultimatum: come quickly, or risk missing
everything.
The brilliance of the plan was in its flexibility. Rather than define itself by
what it was, as previous corridors had, the Last Green Valley was defined by what
it wasn’t. It wasn’t modernized or commercialized, and that’s what made it
special. What is did stand for was left up to the individual towns themselves.
Whether the towns chose to emphasize history or nature, mills or farms, it didn’t
matter. As long as what they emphasized fell under the banner of “authentic New
England,” the theme would remain intact. In this way, the diversity of the region
was not a hindrance but an asset. With just one name, the Last Green Valley had
finally forged an identity, and it was a formidable one.
A New Breed of Heritage Corridor
It did not take long for the new theme to catch on among the valley’s
residents. Spurred on by the publicity efforts of a new interest group, the Last
Green Valley Inc., more than 4,000 residents turned out over Columbus Day
weekend in 1993 to celebrate the region’s heritage.139 During the next 12 months,
private citizens and public officials came together to produce brochures, visitor’s
guides, and press releases for local newspapers. In just one year, volunteers
logged more than 10,000 hours of service and more than 7,000 people took part in
139 Ric Bourie, “Take a Hike in Connecticut,” Boston Globe. 8 September 1994. Web. 31 March
2009.
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the valley’s regional education programs.140 By the time the corridor bill reached
Congress in the fall of 1994, the Last Green Valley movement had been
transformed into a vibrant grassroots effort, unsurpassed by anything in New
England.
On November 2, just five days before the midterm elections, the
QSRVNHC was designated by Congress. The vote was unanimous. Five years
later, the valley was expanded to include nine towns in South-Central
Massachusetts, bringing the total area to just under 1100 square miles.141 Today,
the Last Green Valley stands as one of the most successful land use programs in
the country, recently announcing its intentions to become entirely self-sufficient
by 2015, a first among heritage areas.142 Situated less than 90 minutes from
Boston and New York, it has become a magnet for heritage tourists, raking in an
estimated $89 million over 15 years, compared to just $4.8 million spent by
federal sources.143 More importantly, the Last Green Valley has developed into a
distinct cultural region, something it never could have claimed just 20 years
earlier.
Through its designation, the Last Green Valley opened up a whole new
realm of possibilities for the heritage area movement. Prospective regions no

140 Bill Reid, Op. Cit.
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longer had to be industrial wastelands with clearly defined histories in order to
receive the benefits of heritage tourism. Rather, all a region needed was a
compelling story and a strong grassroots movement to tell it. In this sense, it
didn’t matter if the story was largely made up or opportunistic; in the race to
attract heritage tourists, image was often more important than reality.
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Chapter 5: Turning Ideas into Actions
Are Heritage Areas Really Profitable?

“If you want to understand democracy, spend less time in the library with Plato, and
more time in the buses with people.”

- Simeon Strunsky

In attempting to gauge the profitability of the heritage area program,
empirical data is decidedly difficult to come by. One survey, conducted in 2001
by the Pathways of Progress Heritage Corridor in Pennsylvania, concluded that
designation was responsible for the creation of 337 jobs and $18 million in annual
revenue.144 Another study, commissioned by the Essex National Heritage Area in
Massachusetts, showed an even larger impact: 3,500 annual jobs and $130 million
in tourist spending.145 Finally, a statistical analysis by Michigan State University
estimated that heritage areas had attracted 32 million total visitors, generated
3,000 public-private partnerships, and netted 167,000 hours of volunteer service
during the fiscal year of 2003.146

144 “Path of Progress Heritage System: Visitor Characteristics and Economic Impacts,”
Westsyvania Heritage Corporation. 2002. Web. 4 February 2011. 40.
145 “Cultural Heritage Tourism 2008 Fact Sheet,” National Trust for Historic Preservation. March
2008. Web. 4 February 2011.

146 Daniel Stynes and Ya-Yen Sun, “Economic Impacts of National Heritage Area Visitor
Spending,” Department of Community, Agriculture, Recreation and Resource Studies: Michigan
State University. June 2004. Web. 31 January 2011. 4.
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Of course, with the exception of the MSU study, all of these quantitative
analyses were conducted by organizations affiliated with heritage area programs.
Therefore, because of the strong potential for bias, these results should be taken
with a grain of salt.
However, despite this lack of reliable empirical evidence, it can be fairly
stated that, during the 1990s, there was a marked increase in the perceived
profitability of heritage areas. Before the Last Green Valley, only four regions had
been designated in 10 years. After the success of the LGV, however, there were
19 designations in just six years.147 In fact, the flow of applications was so fast that
Congress found itself unable to deal with them on a case by case basis. Instead, it
was forced to combine several of the proposals into larger omnibus spending bills
and pass them all at once. Clearly, something quite significant was driving this
spike in national interest.
A Quick Break from Theory
Over the past few chapters, I have argued that the heritage area program
was a logical response to newfound concerns over regional identity. These
concerns, I believe, were driven largely by the forces of economic decline,
geographical competition, new regionalism, and later, heritage tourism. Up until
this point, my claims have been largely academic in nature, relying upon books,
journal articles, and the occasional telephone conversation with park officials.

147 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.
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However, in January of 2011, I received an opportunity to attend an actual
planning and strategy session for the Freedom’s Way National Heritage Area in
New Hampshire. In doing so, I feel I was able to gain a degree of valuable firsthand insight into why the heritage area movement had grown so popular.
Freedom’s Way: The Anatomy of a Heritage Area
When I walked into the meeting room, I was struck by how ordinary
everything seemed. Here, in a tiny conference room in Milford City Hall, were
seven men and women, sitting around a table so cramped that their arms and legs
were nearly touching. As I took a seat, they introduced themselves as Freedom’s
Way Inc., and then told me why they had arranged the meeting. Two years earlier,
Freedom’s Way had achieved designation as a heritage corridor, stretching all the
way from Concord, Massachusetts, to Southern New Hampshire. Now, in 2011,
Freedom’s Way Inc. was working on formulating a management plan, which was
due to the Secretary of the Interior in March of 2012. In order to complete this
management plan, each town would need to conduct a formal resource inventory,
explaining its cultural significance within the context of the larger region. At the
time of the meeting, however, the process was running behind schedule, and
Freedom’s Way Inc. was searching for ways to speed things up. After introducing
myself, I sat back and listened to the committee deliberate.
Almost immediately, the conversation turned to money. Apparently,
Freedom’s Inc. was running low on funds and could no longer hire the
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professionals needed to conduct each town’s resource inventory. Instead, it would
have to rely on volunteer assistance, primarily from local historical societies.
However, many of these historical societies had been reluctant to take on the extra
work, and Freedom’s Way needed a way to get them excited about the heritage
area concept. After discussing the problem, Peter, a local historical society
member, offered his own opinion.
“We need to sell this thing as something where everyone can benefit,” he
said, “When people come to visit, they need to buy gas, they need to buy
groceries…there’s revenue in this for everyone.” Richard, a local bookstore
owner, nodded in agreement. “There’s nothing but gain in this for them,” he
exclaimed, “This is the type of program that cuts to the bones of economic
development…the more people know about their community, the more they take
care of it and value it.”
At this point, the group narrowed its focus to the town of Hollis, New
Hampshire, a town that was ready for the next step in the planning process.
Freedom’s Way wanted to help Hollis promote its resource inventory, but in order
to do that, it would need a source of revenue. After a few minutes, the idea of a
travel brochure began to emerge. Inside, it would offer a map of Hollis’ historic
and cultural landmarks, along with a walking route for potential tourists to follow.
“This is the kind of tourism I’m looking for; self-guided,” said May, a chamber of
commerce official, “It’s interactive. They can go out with the kids and walk, and
come back any time they want.” After printing the brochure, the revenue would
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come by selling ad space to local businesses. Instead of actual ads, however, each
business would pay to have its name and location highlighted in the historical
map. “That way,” May explained, “we can advertise without really advertising.”
Before this idea could be approved, however, Peter stepped in once again.
“I think Hollis might want to have a say in this,” he argued, “We need to find a
mover and shaker within the town. We can’t do this from the outside; it is a
regional effort.” Celeste, treasurer of the Milford Historical Society, voiced her
agreement. “Yes, we need to eradicate these imaginary lines and start working
together.”
Eventually, the group settled on a compromise. It would help to organize a
steering committee of six Hollis residents, which would work alongside six
members of Freedom’s Way Inc. By forming a partnership, the planners hoped to
secure the right mix of professional experience and local enthusiasm needed to
produce a successful brochure. According to Richard, this kind of regional
cooperation was the wave of the future. “There is a national force afoot,” he said,
“and we just need to find a way to ride it.”
As the meeting drew to a close, I knew I had witnessed an extraordinary
display of heritage area planning in action. In just 90 minutes, the members of
Freedom’s Way Inc. had expressed many of the same thoughts and ideas I had
been reading about for months. However, this time, those ideas had been
expressed right in front of me, by real people with identifiable names and faces.
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According to these men and women, the heritage area program was indeed an
important mechanism for attracting tourism dollars. However, more than this, it
was seen as a catalyst for community partnerships and a wide variety of
coordinated activities at the local level. In a world where regional cooperation
was an economic necessity, these planners saw heritage areas as a chance to begin
breaking down artificial barriers and working together as a cohesive unit.
Before the meeting ended, I expressed this viewpoint to the members still
in attendance and asked them if they agreed with it. Peter, always quick to offer
his opinion, provided an immediate answer. “Normally, I can’t even get 12 people
to come to one of my meetings at the Brookline Historical Society,” he said,
shrugging his shoulders, “but if we have a network in place, then we can start to
get people excited. Essentially what this whole thing is is a funnel. It is there to
help us do what we want, whatever that is.”
A Closer Look
With nearly 50 designations, no two heritage areas are the same, and it
would be a mistake to assume that all of them are profitable. Furthermore, due to
the lack of unbiased empirical data, the link between regional cooperation and
increased economic competiveness is difficult to quantify. However, for the
activists in Illinois, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, there was no doubt that
these regions represented an opportunity to begin thinking as a team. By scaling
up and forming inter-jurisdictional partnerships, these communities felt that
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heritage areas could allow them to revitalize their economies and stimulate
interest, both among residents and among tourists. Thus, to these places and many
others across the country, the heritage area program was a decidedly good thing.
However, a closer look at the program reveals some serious flaws. For one,
as it grew more popular, it would become increasingly political in nature. Rather
than reflect true national significance, designation was more often the result of
vote trading or patriotic posturing. Furthermore, because of the haphazard and
inconsistent criteria for designation, heritage areas would become easy to get,
difficult to regulate, and almost impossible to get rid of. As the program grew
ever more crowded, many people began to wonder: just where would it end?
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Chapter 6: I Can’t Believe It’s Not Bacon!
The Political Implications Behind Heritage Area Designation
“Oh, I don't blame Congress. If I had $600 billion at my disposal, I'd be
irresponsible, too.”
- Lichty and Wagner

Inside the train car, Senator Ted Kennedy sat facing a small group of
reporters, a bright smile etched upon his face. “Have you ever heard,” he asked
jovially, pointing across the room to Congressmen Richard Neil and Peter Blute
of Massachusetts, “A Republican say nicer things about a Democrat, or a
Democrat say nicer things about a Republican?”148 Some of the reporters shook
their heads in agreement. It was October of 1996, just three weeks before Election
Day, and the bitter tones of partisanship were already evident across the country.
Here in this train car, however, the unmistakable feelings of bipartisanship felt
like a breath of fresh air to everyone on board.
Just the previous week, a bill had passed through Congress reauthorizing
the Blackstone River Valley Heritage Corridor while also expanding its borders
into southern Massachusetts. The bill’s passage had been in jeopardy until the
final moments, and it had taken the full cooperation of democrats and republicans
to pull off the legislative victory. As a “thank you” gesture, private backers of the
bill had staged a celebratory train ride from Worcester, Massachusetts to

148 John Monahan, “Pieces Coming Together: Lawmakers Laud Blackstone Bill,” Worcester
Telegram and Gazette. 12 October 1996. Web. 22 February 2011.
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Woonsocket, Rhode Island, at which point the two state delegations would meet
in a triumphant show of unity.149
As the train reached its destination, an excited throng of politicians and
activists gathered around the platform to greet their guests from Massachusetts.
First among them was Senator John Chaffee, an early and influential supporter
of the original corridor plan. As he strode up to the train car, Chaffee gazed out at
the sea of smiling faces and issued a mock groan of disappointment. Speaking just
loud enough for reporters to hear, he grinned wryly, saying "Just my luck for all
this to be happening when I am not running for reelection."150
Although it was a lighthearted remark, Chaffee’s comment nevertheless
revealed an important force behind the newly ascendant heritage area movement.
As the perceived profitability of these areas became evident, more and more
politicians saw them as an opportunity for political patronage. With a little
persuasion here and a little compromise there, savvy politicians found themselves
able to direct funds towards their districts at little to no political cost. While some
legislators criticized this practice of “pork barrel” spending, many of them
changed their minds when it came time for them to receive their own
designations. After all, one congressman’s pork is another’s bacon.

149 Ibid.
150 Joseph LaPlante, “Heritage Corridor rallies to thank congressional supporters;
A trainload of national and state office holders arrived at old railroad station in
Woonsocket to a warm welcome and lots of praise,” Providence Journal-Bulletin. 15
October 1996. Web. 22 February 2011.
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Scratch my Back and I’ll Scratch Yours: The Art of Political Log Rolling
By the1990s, heritage areas had become a hot commodity on the political
market, and the number of new designations rose accordingly. However, at first
glance, this dramatic rise seemed counterintuitive. While certainly profitable, the
effects of heritage areas tended to be localized and only felt by a handful of
districts. Why on earth, then, would a representative from outside of a proposed
heritage area vote to support one? With no possible benefit to one’s own district,
why waste taxpayer money on such an obvious example of pork barrel spending?
The answer, it turns out, is actually quite simple. When representative A
introduces a bill to obtain funding for his or her district, the bill’s passage
represents a huge net gain for A but only a minor net loss for everyone else.
Oftentimes, another representative, B, will agree to suffer this small loss and vote
for the bill anyway. However, in doing so, B is not acting irrationally. Instead, by
supporting the bill, he has essentially earned himself an “IOU” from A, the value
of which far exceeds the price that B paid to get it. At some future date, when B
needs support for a bill of his own, he may redeem this IOU in exchange a crucial
vote. Thus, in this way, both sides end up getting what they want.151
This strategy of give and take is known as “political log rolling.” Through
its actions, pet spending projects, many of which would never pass on their own,
can end up becoming law. Because of this, log rolling has become an increasingly

151 Gordon Tullock, et. al., Op. Cit., 37.

76

indispensible part of the legislative process,152 and, during the 1990s, it would
serve as an essential tactic in the drive to establish new heritage areas.
In 1996, Congress created an omnibus bill combining the proposals of 12
different heritage areas.153 With so many regions slated to receive designation, the
bill could count on the support representatives from across the eastern seaboard.
However, representatives from west of the Mississippi were not so easily
convinced. Heritage areas had not yet caught on in the Western U.S., a region still
dominated by national parks, and many western legislators were still dismissive of
the entire concept.154
Thus, shortly before the bill came to a vote, one of western legislator,
Senator Frank Murkowski of Alaska, decided to throw a wrench into the entire
process. Using his position as Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, Murkowski refused to let the bill come to the floor. Stating his
opposition to the project, Murkowski nevertheless hinted that his support might be
attainable; all Congress had to do was agree to a controversial provision that
would allow commercial logging in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. With
Election Day fast approaching, a small group of eastern legislators reluctantly

152 Ibid., 49.
153 “Senate to Vote Today on Omnibus National Parks Bill; Massachusetts
Park Measures at Stake as Senate Considers Controversial Murkowski Rider,” PR
Newswire. 30 September 1996. Web. 22 February 2011.

154 John Monahan, “Area Activists Cheer Senate Parks Vote,” Worcester Telegram and Gazette.
4 October 1996. Web. 21 February 2011.
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agreed to a side deal with Murkowski, thus ensuring the bill’s passage.155 Log
rolling, quite literally, had saved the day.
An even more intriguing incident occurred in 1999 when the Last Green
Valley was attempting to expand into Massachusetts, and to everyone’s surprise,
Senator John McCain of Arizona went out of his way to endorse the plan. Just two
years earlier, McCain had castigated the heritage area program as wasteful
spending,156 but now he spoke out as one of its biggest supporters. The difference
was that, this time, McCain had a heritage area of his own to endorse. The Yuma
Crossing Heritage Area was due up for designation the following year and
McCain wanted to build up as much good will as possible.157 Additionally, he had
recently made the decision to run for president, a decision that would require
support from key allies in the New England region.
Acknowledging this fact, McCain jokingly asked that the corridor be
expanded into New Hampshire, the first state to vote in the presidential primaries.
“While we are moving,” quipped Joe Lieberman, who was also running for
president and trying to attract support in the South, “why don’t we expand it into

155 “Senate to Vote Today on Omnibus National Parks Bill; Massachusetts
Park Measures at Stake as Senate Considers Controversial Murkowski Rider,” Op. Cit.
156 US Senate. Smith-Wyden Amendment on County Law Enforcement. 18 Sep. 1997.
105th Cong., 1st Sess. Web. 25 March 2009. 27.
157 US Senate. Subcommittee on National Parks, Historic Preservation, and Recreation. Hearing
on S.919: To amend the Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage Corridor Act of
1994 to expand the boundaries of the Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage
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Corridor.13 October 1999. 106 Cong., 1 Sess. Web. 22 March 2009. 6.
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South Carolina as well?”158 As the Senate chamber filled with raucous laughter, it
became clear that, in the great legislative cog of Washington, a little elbow grease
always comes in handy.
Park Barrel Spending: A Bridge Too Far
Despite the success of the legislative compromises, the heritage area
program soon found itself under attack from a variety of government watchdog
groups. These groups, many of them aligned with the anti-bureaucratic
“Sagebrush Rebellion” in the west, ridiculed what they saw as an outrageous
waste of taxpayer funds.159 Eventually, these complaints from the private sector
began to spill over into the halls of Congress, leading one Republican
representative from Missouri to angrily declare that “Private property owners in
this country are tired of dealing with government bureaucrats who attempt to
classify mud puddles as wetlands and give kangaroo rats equal footing with the
human species.”160
Indeed, by the late 1990s, a movement that had begun with relatively little
opposition now found itself the target of an increasing array of partisan attacks.
As the new millennium approached, many observers began to wonder if the

158 Ibid., 7.
159 For further reading about the Sagebrush rebellion and its effect on the NPS, see Scott Hardt,
“Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship,”
Harvard Environmental Law Review 18 (1994) 345-377.
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heritage area project would end up collapsing under its own weight. In 2001,
however, these questions were put on indefinite hold after the horrific attacks of
September 11th forever changed the way that Americans thought about themselves
and their surroundings.
As American As Apple Pie: Heritage Areas in the Post 9/11 World
Any American old enough to remember the events of 9/11 will certainly
recall the intense feelings of patriotism and pride that swept the country in its
aftermath. Old scores were forgotten, internal conflicts were put on hold, and
partisan divides were temporarily obscured. The drive to come together around a
common set of values was overwhelming, and everywhere, people sought to
define just what it was that made them American.161
Unsurprisingly, this drive to rediscover the roots of American identity
played right into the hands of the National Heritage Area movement. Tourists,
dismayed by the threat of additional hijackings, turned away from distant and
exotic locales in favor of more intimate settings, preferring instead to visit places
of local or regional importance.162 The heritage tourism industry, already enjoying
spectacular growth, reached a whole new level of desirability. Indeed, by the

161 For a more nuanced look at shifting cultural attitudes after September 11th, see Linda
Skitka, “Patriotism or Nationalism? Understanding Post-September 11, 2001, Flag-Display
Behavior,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 35 (2005) 63-80.

162 “An All-American vacation: the 9/11 tragedy has prompted many to seek summer fun close
to home,” Ebony. 1 May 2002. Web. 25 February 2011.
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summer of 2003, heritage areas across the country were reporting record levels of
visitation, a surge which many attributed to the recent attacks.163
Meanwhile, as visitation rates increased, political opposition from
conservative groups suddenly vanished. Attacking symbols of American heritage
after 9/11, they realized, would be akin to political suicide. Cognizant of this fact,
new heritage areas began to embrace their status as American symbols, adopting
titles like “Freedom’s Way,” “Freedom’s Frontier,” and “Journey Through
Hallowed Ground.”164 Essentially, by playing up the theme of nationalism, they
were rendering themselves immune from potential criticism.
Thus, by the beginning of the 21st century, the heritage area movement had
found itself increasingly enmeshed in the messy world of politics. For many
regions, the path to designation lay, not in improving the credibility of their
theme, but rather in gaining the support of as many senators and representatives as
possible. Essentially, support from the National Park Service was seen as a prize,
and the regions that could lobby and organize most effectively were those most
likely to win it. In this sense then, the emerging competition between regions was
not only economic, but political as well.
Up until the present day, however, this competition for heritage area
designations was not viewed as a zero-sum game. Indeed, with 49 bills and 49

163 Dan Rowe, Op. Cit.
164 Hiroko Sato, “Fascinating Saga of ‘Freedom’ Comes to Stage,” Lowell Sun. 12 November
2008. Web. 13 March 2011.
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votes of passage,165 there certainly seemed to be enough room in the program for
everybody. However, in recent years, there has emerged the ever-growing threat
of overexpansion. With no clearly defined criteria for what constitutes national
significance, virtually any region can become a heritage area. Furthermore, with
no enforceable means of cutting funding, a region, once designated, remains on
the federal payrolls indefinitely. Thus, unless things change from their current
path, the heritage area program will soon run out of money, and if it does, the
regions slowest on their feet will be left with nothing.

165 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.
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Chapter 7: No More Room at the Inn
The Coming Crisis in the Heritage Area Movement
“When everyone is special, no one is.” - The Incredibles
In October of 2010, I spoke with Heather Scotten, assistant coordinator for
the National Park Service’s heritage area program. After a few minutes of
conversation, I asked her if the program was in danger of outgrowing the
relatively limited amount of funds set aside to support it. “I think that’s a great
question,” she replied candidly, “and it’s something that we’re really struggling
with as a program.” In her opinion, the popularity of the heritage area movement
was incommensurate with its financial support, and barring a change in the
designation process, the National Park Service would be unable to keep up.
The following week, I spoke to the other assistant coordinator, Katie
Durcan, and received a similar response. “Our biggest challenge,” she said, “is
our own success. Just since 2006, our program has doubled in size, but the
funding has remained the same. The math just doesn’t add up. We have 49 areas,
each trying to reach the million dollar funding cap, and we only have a $17
million budget……17 divided by 49? Well, you get the picture.”
Clearly, among those closest to the program, there is a growing concern
that the heritage area movement is unsustainable. This unsustainability, however,
goes far beyond simple concerns of funding and resources. Rather, the problem is
systemic; from the moment a region applies for designation to the moment it is
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scheduled to stop receiving funding, the entire process is awash in subjectivity,
irregularity, and above all, inconsistency.
The Slippery Slope of National Significance
In 1994, a group of congressmen introduced a bill that would establish
criteria for the designation of new National Heritage Areas. One such requirement
was a clearly-worded definition of the term “national significance,” which until
then, had been left up to each individual region to define on its own terms.166 The
problem with this, according to the bill’s sponsors, was that the process was
entirely subjective. In the words of Representative John Duncan, “Why, you can
come up with a historical reason to designate just about any place in the
country.”167 With more than 800,000 buildings, objects, and structures listed on
the National Register of Historical Places, there was literally no limit to what a
region could use to justify its significance.168 Because of this, the designation
process was necessarily dependent upon political factors rather than historical
ones, a situation which the backers of the bill found unacceptable.
Although this drive to establish a consistent designation process was
supported by the park service, it would nevertheless fail to be approved by
166 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, Hearings on HR 3707: To
establish an American Heritage Areas Partnership Program in the Department of the Interior. 22
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Congress. Over the next 17 years, no less than eight different bills would be
introduced to remedy the situation, and not a single one would pass.169 This
gridlock was encouraged by many leaders of the heritage area movement, who
feared that a standardized designation process would hamper the efforts of a
program defined by its creativity and diversity.170
For supporters of the standardized approach, however, these protestations
from heritage areas were nothing short of ridiculous, and in 2003, Senator Craig
Thomas of Wyoming decided to take his concerns to the Senate floor. Addressing
Kathryn Higgins, Vice President of Public Policy for The National Trust for
Historic Preservation, he asked her if the entire designation process was not just a
thinly veiled excuse to stimulate economic development. When she replied that
designation was more about partnership and local activity, Thomas responded,
“Well, do you not suppose that there are more than 40 little towns across the
United States that could use some main street activity? If there is going to be no
criteria, then why can’t I sign up for a few [heritage areas] in Wyoming?”171 For
Thomas and others, there seemed little reason why some areas should be deemed
“significant” enough to receive federal help while others should not.

169 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.
170 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, Op. Cit., 49.
171 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing on S.311: To Conduct Oversight on the
Designation and Management of Heritage Area, Op. Cit., 27.
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A Backwards Process
In addition to defining national significance, each heritage area is required
to submit a management plan to the Secretary of the Interior outlining its overall
theme and administrative structure. However, rather than submit it before
designation, each region’s management plan is not due until three years after its
initial establishment.172 Thus, when Congress votes on a proposal, it often has
little idea about how a given region actually will be operated. With few details to
criticize, opposition is frequently limited, and among all 49 heritage area
proposals introduced to Congress, not a single one has ever been voted down.173
For many critics, this process of “planning after designation” was
decidedly inefficient. Rather than allowing regions to justify their existence after
the fact, they argued that heritage areas should be forced to make their purpose
clear right from the start.174 However, despite these objections, the heritage area
designation process would remain unchanged.
A Never-ending Commitment
In their enabling legislation, most heritage areas are designated with socalled “sunset provisions.” Essentially, these provisions authorize funding for a
certain period of time, usually 10 to 15 years, after which the region is expected to
172 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.
173 Heather Scotten, Op. Cit.
174 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing: To Conduct Oversight on National
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stop relying upon federal money and support itself. However, although many
heritage areas are more than 15 years old, no sunset measures have ever been
invoked.175 Rather, when regions reach their funding limit, they almost always
apply for reauthorization in order to gain another 10 to 15 years of federal
support. One heritage area, the Illinois and Michigan Canal, has even been reauthorized twice. In most cases then, these supposed deadlines are largely
meaningless, and what begins as a temporary means of assistance can often turn
into a never-ending commitment.
However, while demands for funds have been steadily increasing, actual
assistance has not. Between 2004 and 2010, the heritage area program received an
average annual budget of approximately $15 million.176 On February 11, 2011,
however, President Obama called for a 50% reduction in heritage area spending in
response to growing concerns over the federal budget deficit.177 With the NPS
already suffering severe losses, the administration hoped to free up more funding
for the country’s national parks, and to do this, other efforts such as the National
Heritage Area program would have to be de-prioritized. As of April 2011, no
decision has been made by Congress, but even if Obama’s cuts are rejected, it
seems only a matter of time until the heritage area program feels the effects of an
increasingly tough fiscal climate.
175 Heather Scotten, Op. Cit.
176 Ibid.
177 “NPS FY 2012 Budget at a Glance,” National Park Service. 14 February 2011. Web. 2 April
2011.
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Looking Forward: Future Problems for the Heritage Area Program
For nearly 30 years, the heritage area program has managed to survive
with a haphazard, shoestring approach to the designation process. When resources
were abundant, this subjective and inconsistent model often was ignored, largely
because every proposal that came to a vote succeeded in achieving designation.
With a 100% success rate, few regions had any inclination to register complaints.
However, with a shrinking base of resources, the heritage area program will
almost certainly be forced into making some difficult decisions. If, at some future
point, the park service feels the need to begin supporting some regions and not
others, then suddenly, the inconsistent and political nature of the program will
begin to become more problematic. In essence, the federal government would be
supporting geographical regions simply because of their superior lobbying and
organizational skills, a situation which would call into question some of the very
basic tenets of new regionalist development.
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Conclusion: The Never-ending Struggle
“Don’t hate the player, hate the game.” – Unknown

With its emphasis on celebrating cultural identity, the heritage area
program obscures what is, in reality, a much larger struggle to attain the benefits
of regional cooperation. By using heritage as a rallying point for a wide variety of
grassroots activities, many communities feel that they can build the vast networks
of social capital needed to survive in an increasingly austere economic climate. In
this sense then, heritage area designation often serves as an important spark. With
the legitimizing support of the National Park Service, local communities can
begin to leverage their vague feelings of shared identity into more tangible
economic results.
As with any new fad, however, latecomers often are excluded. With
increasing demand for funding and a finite supply of resources, the heritage area
program is nearing a point where it will no longer be able to accept new
designations. At this point, the federal government will find itself supporting
some regions in their quest to achieve geographical competitiveness while leaving
others behind. Furthermore, these regions will be receiving support, not because
of their historical worthiness, but rather because of their ability to recognize
economic trends and act on them more quickly than their neighbors. Thus, in
many ways, the heritage area program is simply an extension of the competitive
new federalist ethic that emerged more than thirty years ago.
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Of course, in looking at heritage areas, it is easy to criticize them as
inherently unfair or objectionable. However, in a larger sense, it is difficult to
blame these communities for wanting to ensure their economic survival. In a
world where public-private partnerships and regional coordination are essential,
one region’s gain is often another region’s loss, and places that fail to adapt are
likely to get left behind.
Thus, in the end, any unfairness must not be blamed upon individual
regions or even upon the heritage area program as a whole, but rather upon the
basic realities of resource apportionment. For as long as governments have
existed, they have always had the unenviable task of distributing a finite amount
of wealth to a virtually endless amount of interests. The only difference is that,
today, these interests are being defined less by ideology and class, and more by
geography. Certainly, in looking at the heritage area movement, it is legitimate to
criticize the disingenuous and misleading manner in which it has been carried out.
However, in the grand scheme of things, heritage areas are just one possible
solution to a struggle as old as civilization itself.
After all, though the rules may have changed, the game remains the same.
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APPENDIX

Figure 1: National Heritage Area designations through 2006. Regions are
numbered chronologically by date of designation. Note the high density of NHAs
east of the Mississippi River, especially in the urbanized Northeastern corridor.
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Figure 2: Total number of NHA designations over time. Note the relatively slow
rate of increase before 1995 and the comparatively fast rate of increase after 1995.
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Figure 3: The Illinois and Michigan
Canal. Completed in 1848, the canal
stretched 96 miles from Chicago to
La Salle, connecting Lake Michigan
to the Illinois River. Today, the
I&M Canal National Heritage
Corridor comprises 450 square miles
of land on either side of the now
defunct canal.
Source: Illinois State Archives
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Figure 4: Timeline of I&M Canal Corridor Designation overlaid with a graph of
Illinois state unemployment between 1976 and 1986. Note how the entire
planning stage occurs during a period of severe rising joblessness.
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Jerry Adelmann pitches plan to Open Lands
“Illinois: Our Hidden Wilderness” published in the Chicago Sun Times
Official Heritage Area Plan Drafted by the NPS and Open Lands
Heritage Area Bill introduced to Congress
Meeting with Secretary Watt
Congressional Hearing
Illinois and Michigan Canal NHC officially designated by law

Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 5: A map showing the
extent of the Quinebaug and
Shetucket River Valley
National Heritage Corridor
(Last Green Valley). The
original 1994 designation
included 26 towns in
Northeastern Connecticut,
and was expanded in 1999 to
include nine additional towns
in Massachusetts.
Source: Last Green Valley, Inc.

Figure 6: The satellite photo
displayed on the Last Green
Valley’s official website. It
attempts to depict heritage
corridor as the sole breach in
the metropolis between
Boston and Washington DC.
Source: Last Green Valley, Inc.
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CAPSTONE SUMMARY
Background Information
National Heritage Areas (NHAs) are federally approved entities,
affiliated with but not directly administered by the National Park Service (NPS).
In a very broad sense, NHAs exist to showcase the natural, historical, and cultural
resources of a particular geographic region. By raising such awareness, the
program hopes to preserve these “nationally significant” landscapes for future
generations to understand and appreciate.
However, unlike their close cousin, the National Park, heritage areas are
not owned directly by the federal government. Although all heritage areas are
approved by Congress, the NPS acts as a purely advisory body, providing
technical and monetary support to regions that request it. In this relationship, the
federal government is unable to impose environmental standards or land-use
restrictions of any kind, and all activity within the region ultimately derives its
legitimacy from local sources. In this sense, heritage areas represent a new trend
within the National Park Service, one which is focused less upon top-down
control and more upon cooperation and partnership across multiple jurisdictions.
In recent years, heritage areas have become quite popular, especially
among urban areas in the eastern United States deemed unsuitable for national
parks. Over the past 30 years, 49 NHAs have been designated by Congress, and
today, nearly one-third of Americans live within the confines of these regions.
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Despite their increasing ubiquity, however, heritage areas have generally been
dismissed as insignificant by the general public. Furthermore, academic literature
on NHAs is decidedly sparse, and the articles that do exist tend to focus
exclusively upon the local and regional benefits of designation.
However, as I attempt to show in my paper, I believe that the NHA
program is a reflection of much deeper changes occurring within the American
political and economic system. As federal assistance grew increasingly scarce
after 1980, there was a distinct trend towards inter-regional competition in the
United States. By forcing individual communities into direct competition with
each other, the government created a system in which the ability of a locality to
out-innovate and out-compete its neighbors was necessary for its long-term
financial stability. In this environment, the concept of geographical place became
progressively more important, and increasingly, communities found the need to
pool their collective talents in order to succeed on the national stage. Thus, while
there was a trend towards competition among regions, there was a simultaneous
trend toward cooperation within regions.
By helping communities to coalesce around shared regional themes,
heritage areas often acted as important tools in this struggle to obtain scarce
economic resources. With the legitimizing support of the NPS, many communities
felt that NHAs could provide the spark they needed to begin working together as a
regional entity. In other words, heritage areas were more than just abstract
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representations of culture and history: they were tangible mechanisms to stimulate
cooperation and collaboration in a competitive economy.
Behind these seemingly useful benefits, however, heritage areas also
represented a more troublesome reality. With its haphazard setup, NHA
designations were a highly subjective process, guided more by the whims of
politics than by any substantive claims of national significance. Furthermore, with
limited funding, those closest to the program realized that the rapid pace of
designations would soon become unsustainable. Still, as of 2011, no efforts to
address these problems have been adopted.
Thus, with these distressing realities, a few important questions about the
overall nature of NHAs must be raised: If every region can be nationally
significant, then what is the ultimate purpose of the program? Is it simply to
promote economic development through intra-regional cooperation and increased
visibility? If the goal is indeed to improve regional competitiveness, then is it fair
for the federal government to give some regions a leg-up and not others? If
funding does run out, which regions will be left with designations and which
regions will be left with nothing?
Ultimately, I conclude that, given its current setup, the NHA program is an
inherently exclusionary movement. By helping some communities in their quest
to attain comparative geographical advantages, the park service is essentially
providing a few select regions with the tools needed to out-compete their
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neighbors. However, in making this point, the paper does not attempt to impose a
value-judgment one way or the other. Rather, by providing a clear and truthful
account of current developments, it simply hopes to uncover a side of the NHA
program that has so far not been made clear to the general public.
Methods Used
In making sense of the NHA program, I attempted to enlist the support of
both primary and secondary research materials. In the early stages of the project, I
relied primarily upon existing books and articles to help build up a background of
knowledge on the subject. Next, once I had a firm grasp of the nature of the
program, I made an effort to speak with a variety of experts in the field. Over the
next several months, I held in-depth conversations with both NPS officials and
academic observers, and in January of 2011, I was able to attend a planning
session for the NHA in my home state of New Hampshire. Finally, I was fortunate
enough to speak with Gerald Adelmann, the man generally credited with the
creation of the heritage area concept. Through these conversations, I was able to
supplement my secondary research and transform my ideas into something more
concrete and reliable.
Additionally, because the NHA program is extremely large and diverse, I
found it necessary to take a more inductive approach towards understanding it. To
this end, I focused the majority of my research upon three individual heritage
areas. By choosing three areas with significantly different backgrounds, I
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attempted to gain as wide an understanding of the program as possible given my
limited time and resources. Furthermore, with personal contacts in all three of
these regions, I was able to utilize first-hand accounts largely unavailable from
the other 46 regions.
Lastly, in telling the story of the NHA program, I made a conscious
decision to deviate from the traditional methods of academic discourse. In my
mind, the intended audience of this paper was not fellow researchers, but rather
intelligent and inquisitive members of the general public. Considering this, my
writing style was generally more informal and dialogue-based than most
undergraduate theses. By engaging with my audience in such a manner, I hoped to
make my arguments more accessible and enjoyable to the average reader.
Significance
As an object of study, NHAs transcend the limitations of any single field
of academia. In their expression, they can be analyzed from a variety of different
viewpoints, from the scientific to the conceptual, and everything in between. With
my paper, however, I attempt to show that, rather than economics, politics, or
history, it is geography which ties the stories of these regions together. Other
fields may be able to explain the individual components of heritage areas, but it is
only through geographical analysis that a deeper understanding of the larger
whole can be reached. In a very real sense, it is these spatial interactions between
regions that give the movement its real significance and meaning.
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Thus, with this paper, my goal is not only to raise awareness about a
fascinating federal program, but also to provide readers with an introduction to
the discipline that I value so deeply. By leading them through a careful and
thoughtful examination of a specific problem, I hope to show that geography is
more than an academic discipline; it is a way of thinking about and engaging with
the broader world.

